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OREWORD 
The second edition of t he Atlas ''A New Emerging Rural World" is 
being published in t he specific context of a general decline in com-
modity prices and a slowdown in growth in Africa. after our econo-
mies fai led to ensure the equitable sharing of the benefits of growth 
registered in t he years in which Africa·s growth rate was one of the 
highest in t he world. 
The downward trend in commodity prices may be a constraint. but it 
is also an opportunity in the sense that public and private stakehol-
ders will have to be more creat ive and innovative in order to unlock 
new sources of endogenous growth. wealth and inclusive employ-
ment wit h greater spillover effects for the region 's economies. 
Today. t he challenge is to ident ify new tools for sustainable econo-
mic growth. this time based on principles of inclusion and equity. 
while maintaining a steady growth rate. Meeting these condit ions 
will enable African economies to cope with a populat ion that is still 
booming and wi th t he ever-growing number ofyoung people looking 
for education. training and jobs. These challenges are set against a 
backdrop of climate change and resource depletion. calling for the 
use of production techniques that are tailored to environmental 
challenges. 
The principles of inclusion and equity imply adopting spatial and ter-
ritorial approaches and policies that ensure rural areas benefit f rom 
the same developments and initiat ives as urban areas: that res-
ponsible investments are made in rural areas: and that women and 
young people have access to t he facto rs of production, especially 
training. land. water. finance. renewable energy. markets and income 
that reflects t he f ruits of their labour. 
Renewing public policies on t he basis of local development would 
help to t ackle the root causes by providing appropriate solutions to 
ensure people settle and remain in their areas of origin. The develop-
ment of local authorities should be based on their specific characte-
ristics. t heir ecosystems. their cultural heritage and their know-how 
combined with technological innovat ion and learning. especially for 
young people and women. 
Although a healthy dose of social measures for the rural sector is a 
precondition for its development - as was and is still the case in the 
developed countries -. the fact remains that far-reaching market-
based solutions need to be implemented simultaneously. The pro-
gressive t ransition f rom solidarity systems to mixed market systems 
will help to stimulate investment and the development of structural 
activities capable o f laying the foundations for this much -needed 
change. 
The governance of our natural resources and t he financial resources 
they generate are t he cornerstone of our st ructural change: they re-
quire appropriate solutions at t he global. regional. national and local 
levels. 
Over the years. t his Atlas. which will gradually evolve into a collabora-
t ive project. will serve as a reference tool enabling us to monitor pro-
gress towards these goals and to take cont ro l of our path to achie-
ving Agenda 2063. lt is therefore a perfect addition to the toolkit 
the NEPAD Agency wil l use in it s role as a think tank and an evaluator 
of the implementation of the African Union's rural transformat ion 
policies. 
Dr Ibrahim Assane Mayaki 
ChiefExecutive Offlcer. NEPAD Agency 
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REGAINING CONTROL 
OF TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Against the backdrop of globalisation with tensions running high, white our planet struggles 
against climate change and the depletion of non-renewable resources, Africa is faced with the 
challenge of inventing original development models. The se models need to address the conside-
rable requirements generated by improvements in the standard of living, population growth and 
economic diversification, without reproducing traditional growth models that are no longer sus-
tainable. This challenge is central to the African Union's Agenda 2063 for the structural transfor-
mation of the continent. lt implies mobilising ail territorial resources available, in both urban and 
rural areas, in orderto make full use of the range ofexisting spatial dynamics. 
• Enhancing territorial dynamlcs 
After two decades of structural adjustment policies and their consequences. Africa has entered 
a new phase of change over the last 15 years: continued demographic and urban t ransition. sus-
tained economic growth driven by an expanding domestic market. rising commodity prices and 
growth in foreign investment. Although the recent situation marked by conflicts and a slowdown 
in growth linked to falling mining and o il product prices calls for caution, these changes have mo-
ved the continent forward from the risk of deadlock to the hope of emergence. 
These dynamics could give the im pression that according to past transitions observed in other 
continents. the rural world is doomed to graduai decline in faveur of rapidly expanding cities. sup-
ported by a solid industrialisation process. A careful examination of changes in African economies 
and societies. however. reveals a far more complex. diverse picture. with major differences across 
the count ries and regions of the continent. 
First. the population boom. with the arrivai of 1.35 billion more people by 2050. will not be confi -
ned to the cities. which will continue to grow rapidly, without reaching the pace observed over the 
last 25 years. The population should remain predominantly rural until the 2040s. and population 
density in rural areas will continue to increase. with 350 million new people by 2050. Africa will 
also be the only part of the world where the rural populat ion will continue to expand beyond that 
date. Next. for the time being. urban economies are not following the industry-based develop-
ment model observed elsewhere. African cities are largely built on commercial and administrative 
incarne and are characterised by the scale of informai employment. which is often low-skilled. in 
trade, services and very small craft and building enterprises. 
However. increasing population density in Af rica is also shaping territories due to ever closer lin-
kages between cities. rural areas and the small towns connected to them. The unprecedented 
scale of circulations - of products. people and ideas -facilitates the emergence of new territorial 
dynamics based on the mobilisation of resources of different origins. encouraging innovation and 
contributing to spatial reshaping. 
A r-E>N EMJ0-0 RI..IW. VvffiD 
On the one hand. the rapid development of telephony. the - still tentative - progress of access 
to energy and the construction of major transport and irrigation infrastructure all vastly increase 
the attractiveness of some regions. sometimes to the detriment of others. The growth of mining 
activities and local and foreign investors' interest in the most fertile agricultural land are often pre-
sented as new leverage for development. Because of the concentration of capital they imply. the 
variety of stakeholders they mobilise. the different decision-making levels they involve and their 
ambivalent impacts on the development of their host regions. these activities illustrate the com-
plexit y of the processes underway. 
The other side to rural change. which is notas visible being more fragmented and less publicised. 
is driven by the efforts of rural families to combine their m ultiple activities. which straddle urban 
and rural areas and are sometimes supported by remittances. and to sustain places that may be 
remote. The growing audience of farmers' organisations gives greater visibility to these actions. 
which often build on the dynamism of local. national and cross-border markets associating far-
mers. small t raders. and entrepreneurs engaged in agricultural and food product processing, who 
all feed the cities and generate the vast rnajority of current jobs. The examples of the Ouaga-
dougou-Accra and Nairobi-Kampala corridors, the Senegal River Valley and the Lake Chad region 
il lustrate this intensity oflinkages between urban and rural areas. These linkages are reshaping the 
economic geography with the emergence of new development centres. beyond the outward-
looking agricultural or mining export sectors that have until now been associated with economic 
modernity in Africa. 
Between hope. tension and conflict. linked in particular to use of and access to natural resources. 
there is a growing chorus of voices stressing the importance of including these territorial dyna-
mics in discussions underway on development models. The extent of needs connected with 
sustainable improvements in the standard of living implies striking a balance between economic 
performance. equitable wealth redistribution and respect for the environment. Although Africa's 
increasing integration in the global economy continues to provide numerous opportunities. the 
vagaries of international markets also imply effectively mobilising the breadth of the African do-
mestic market and developing the resources provided by territorial dynamics. 
• Avoiding the excesses and risks of metropolisation 
Only a small number of countries situated at both ends of the continent have so far truly initia-
ted their structural change. with more diversified. wealthier economies that are supported by 
territorially balanced urbanisation with a high density of economic activity and more effective 
integration in the global economy. Elsewhere. economic changes paint a mixed picture. in which 
structural elements still override recent dynamics. Agriculture remains the bedrock of activity for 
a predominantly rural population and urbanisation is continuing. mainly in favour of the capitals. 
based on an informai sector that makes it difficult to finance the infrastructure needed and to shift 
the balance to other cities and rural areas. lntegration in the global economy remains f ragile. with 
exports of primary commodities that undergo little or no processing (mining. forestry and export 
agriculture). 
These activities. and especially those in the mining sector. inflate grovvth in absolute terms and. 
in some countries, stimulate investment dynamics. However. they rarely have any real spillover 
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effects. create few jobs and are of little benefit to the majority of the population. They stimulate 
growth in the biggest cities through investment in property and public works. which often leads 
to neglect of urbanisation from the below. that of small towns. and of agriculture. by fostering the 
apparently easier option of food models based on imported products. 
These dynamics accentuate the metropolisation movement. which further reinforces the ter-
ritorial imbalances inherited from the colonial period - where the capital was usually the port of 
export - t hat were amplified after independence. For political reasons. the states have largely 
focused on their capitals to the detriment of small and medium-sized cit ies. These cities have 
grown in size due to population growth. but without benefitting from public investment in inf ras-
tructure and services, thereby increasing the appeal of the big city and enhancing population 
differences. Today, there are considerable threshold effects between the biggest city and the 
secondary towns in many countries, and the growing demands linked to this urban macrocephaly 
are an obstacle to the overall regional development. The si tuation is heightened by the horizontal. 
often poorly controlled nature of urban development. which magnifies network costs {highways. 
transport. water. sanitation and electricity) and the burden on public finances. 
Because of this metropolisation. which is reflected in the progressive extension of large-scale 
conurbations that are increasingly difficult to manage. the public authorities are paying more at-
tention to urban matters. to the detriment of "rural affairs". This trend is encouraged by the new 
economic geography rationale. which sees agglomeration economies as a key driver of growth. 
whereas the concentration of activities and people provides only very limited leverage where low 
value-added activities are involved and people are poor. 
The challenge is therefore to restore balance between regions. which requires support for rural 
dynamics and for the development of secondary towns. Failing this. there is a major risk of fur-
ther rural depopulation and large-scale migration towards the most populated urban areas -
with heightened economic. social. environmental and political tensions - and the simultaneous 
development of spatially marginalised areas with no prospects for the people living there. ln the 
absence of significant compensatory financing. government withdrawal and neglect of entire 
regions are an open door to long-term instability. The areas of influence won over the last 10 
years by Al Qaeda in the lslamic Maghreb and Boko Haram in the Sudano-Sahelian region. or by 
the older Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda and its northern and western neighbours. stand as a 
strong reminder of this harsh reality. 
• r-osterlng activlty and employment through territorial development 
Avoiding dangerous dual strategîes that assume areas ofinvestment and growth on the one hand 
and areas of decline on the other, while meeting the needs of structural change. implies getting 
off the beaten track of "business as usual" and the traditional view of public policies. 
This change is ail the more necessary given that Africa is facing a surge in its working age popu -
lat ion. which will become the main source of growth in the global workforce. Over the next 15 
years. 440 million young people will reach working age. This massive influx of young working-age 
people is an exceptional opportunity for the dynamism of Af rican economies. provided that the 
level of training is enhanced and that the economic and institutional environment is conducive to 
investment. 
Meeting this challenge implies moving away from an excessively segmented. centralised ap-
proach to public policies. Despite progress in regional policies and decentralisation. most policy 
and public investment decisions are still made by states and their sectoral adm inistrations. which 
are disinclined to take account of the diversity and complexîty of territorial issues. The statistical 
segmentation of rural and urban areas, whose boundaries are increasingly blurred by densifica -
t ion and lifestyle changes. as well as that of public action between sectors and fields of activity. 
makes it difficult to identify existing economic, social and spatial dynamics and their support. 
There is no sectoral silver bullet - like industrialisation. which is often put forward - that would 
t ackle the scale of the continent's needs. There is. however, an urgent need to reinvest in m ulti-
sectoral, place-based sustainable development strategies that help to build on assets and to take 
into account the constraints inherent in the development of the different regions. 
This "re-territorialisation" of public policies calls for the implementation of participatory ap-
proaches. stronger local authorities and concerted regulations between different levels of gover-
nance. as well as reinvestment in infrastructure and services in rural towns and small and medium-
sized cit ies. lt could help to revitalise local development processes and to create jobs through the 
densification of rural-urban linkages and better support for initiatives. By simultaneously planning 
the development of agriculture and that of small towns from a territorialised approach based on 
the idea of supply and employment basins. the renewal of public policies is one of the key drivers 
of structural change in Africa. 
Bruno Losch, Denis Pesche, 
Géraud Magrin et Jacques lmbernon 
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RURAL AND URBAN DENSIFICATION 
CONTINUES 
The African continent is vast with an unequally 
distributed population. lt has experienced 
high population growth over the last 50 years, 
which has corrected its former demographic 
deficit. If current dynamics continue, the 
results wi/1 be population densification, with 
serious implications for the relationship 
between people and natural resources, and 
changes to territorial configurations. 
• The exceptional scale of 
the population boom in Africa 
The African continent is the last region in the 
world to have begun its demographic transi-
tion. Unlike in Asia. where demographic change 
was rapid, this transition is slower than expec-
ted - United Nations projections are regularly 
revised upwards - . and is accompanied by an 
exceptional population boom the population 
is expected to reach almost 2.5 billion people 
in 2050 (compared to 1.2 billion in 2015). This 
growth will result in a complete reversai of rela-
tive demographic weights: in 2050. Africa will 
have three and a halftimes as many people as 
Europe. whereas the European population was 
twice that of Africain 1950. 
This growth is explained by better public health 
and continued high fertility rates resulting in 
an average annual growth rate of around 2.5% 
(compared to 1 o/o in Asia). These average ag-
gregate values clearly hide considerable dif-
ferences between North Africa and Southern 
Africa, where the number of children per wo-
man has dropped to less than 3. and the rest 
of sub-Saharan Africa. where this figure often 
still stands at between 4 and 5. Diversit y is also 
seen within West. East and Central Af rica. and 
is highly correlated with the rate of urbanisa-
tion, with regions or countries where the num -
ber of children per woman is still more than 6 
(the Central Sahel, DR Congo and Angola). 
Sub-Saharan Africa is about to undergo de-
mographic change on an unprecedented 
scale. While its population increased over the 
last 40 years in proportions equivalent to those 
of China or lndia. growth over the next 40 years 
will be more than twice as high ( 1.4 billion more 
people instead of 650 million). whereas the po-
pulation of China will decline and that of lndia 
will increase by only 400 million people. 
• A slow shift from rural 
tourban 
These population dynamics will accompany 
the progressive shift from rural to urban. Urba-
nisation in Africa has skyrocketed. with a ten-
fold increase in the number of city dwellers 
since the 1950s. but it remains low in compari-
son with the global average. with the exception 
of the Mediterranean coasts and the mining 
reg ions of South Africa. The urban boom of the 
19 50s to 19 70s (with annual growth rates close 
to 7°1o) was followed by more moderate urban 
growth. which has stabilised at around 4% per 
year since the 1980s. as a consequence of the 
structural crisis. This trend has not been alte-
red by the economic recovery of the 2000s. 
The countryside thus maintains ils demogra-
phic lead over the cities and the urban/rural ra-
tio remains at less than 1. with the exception of 
North Africa, South Africa and several coastal 
countries in the Gulf of Guinea. Although the 
relative importance of cities will continue to 
increase. providing more and more opport uni-
ties for rural producers (the urban/rural ratio will 
rise from 0.6 on average today to 1.2 in 2050). 
the population in the countryside will continue 
to grow in absolute terms. This is a second 
African exception. since the rural population is 
projected to include 350 m illion more people 
by 2050 and to carry on expanding after this 
date, contrary to the rest of the world. 
• A new population pattern 
The demographic surge is reshaping popula-
tion distribution. This has long been marked 
by low average population densities and 
contrasts between highly populated regions 
and largely uninhabited areas. as a result of 
interconnected environmental and historical 
factors. Low-density areas often reflect the 
arid environment. such as the Namib Kalahari, 
the Horn of Africa and especially the Sahara. 
They also correspond to the great equatorial 
forest of the Congo basin. The older areas of 
settlement are situated in fertile zones, such 
as the Nile Valley or the highlands of the Great 
Lakes, Ethiopia and western Cameroon. and in 
environments that have historically provided 
protection. such as the mountains of North 
Africa and the m angroves of West Africa. 
The agricultural export and m ining regions 
that sprang up in the late 19th century also 
established large urban and rural populations. 
The continent's average population density 
has risen from 3.3 people per km2 in 1900 
to 7.5 in 1950 and 39.3 in 2015. For the last 
50 years. high density areas have become 
more so. while the agricultural frontiers have 
pushed into regions that were once spar-
sely populated (Madagascar, south-western 
Côte d'Ivoire. and northern Cameroon). Sorne 
urban centres in the Sahara are even growing 
through the control of m ining activities and 
m igration. despite an unstable geopolitical 
environment. The few cases of rural 
decline (inland Gabon. Algerian Kabylia) are the 
exception. 
These dynamics are putting increasing pres-
sure on natural resources: extensive long fa l-
low agriculture systems based on family user 
rights are being called into question. Ten-
sions are growing between uses and users of 
land and water (agriculture. livestock farming. 
urbanisation and m ining). To address climate 
uncertainty linked to global changes and to 
the need to step up agricultural producti-
vity. the use of water resources is increasing. 
Shortages are sometimes a threat. as in North 
Africa. Deforestation is affecting biodiversity 
while eroding the environmental capital. 
With population densification. the bounda-
ries between rural and urban areas are blur-
ring. They are witnessing the emergence of 
new territories on the outskirts of major cities 
and roads linking regional capitals via strings 
of secondary towns. This is exemplified by 
spatial dynamics between the coast of the 
Gulf of Guinea and the Sudanian zone, or in 
the eastern part of the Great Lakes region. 
Large-scale intra- and inter-regional migra-
tions are to be expected as a result of this 
exceptional population growth. as well as 
spatial inequalities in terms of develop-
ment that are likely to grow in the absence of 
support policies. 
Bruno Losch and Géraud Magrin 
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YOUTH EMPLOYMENT: 
A CHALLENGE FOR THE CONTINENT 
The working age population in Africa is young 
and growing in size, constituting a key asset 
for the development of the continent. But it 
is also a major challenge, as the massive in-
flux of young people into unstructured labour 
markets is causing serious problems. This 
challenge calls for proactive public policies 
focusing on training and support for labour-in-
tensive sectors. 
• Towards the demographic 
dividend in Africa 
One of the main consequences of the demo-
graphic transition underway - both populat ion 
growth and changes in the age structure - is 
the dramatic surge in the working age popu-
lation (people aged 15 to 64). According to 
United Nations projections. by 2050. it will in-
crease by 875 million people. and will account 
for almost 70% of growth in the global vvork-
force. Over the same period. the working age 
population will shrink in Europe (-90 million 
people) and especially in China (-215 million 
people). 
This growth in absolute terms will be accompa-
nied by a declining age dependency ratio. With 
one working age person for every dependent 
person in the 1980s and 1990s. at the height 
of structural adjustment (while China had two 
working age persons for every dependent per-
son). Africa was crippled in terms of its saving. 
investment and consumption potential. The 
dependency burden linked to high fertility rates 
compromised the development of productive 
capacities. income growth and improvements 
in the standard of living. 
The continent will thus be in a position to gra-
dually "reap" its demographic dividend - the 
unique period in population dynamics when 
the working age population and the dependent 
population are respectively at their highest and 
lowest levels - . since the ratio should reach 1.6 
in 2050 and plateau at 1.8 in the 2070s. This 
dividend will nevertheless be smaller than in 
East Asia (China currently has a ratio of 2.5) 
due to continued relatively high fertility and the 
extension oflife expectancy. 
However. this dividend will only be effective 
if economic conditions enable full use of the 
additional labour force. If j ob opportunities are 
lacking. working age population growth could 
rapidly become a burden that generates social 
and political tension. The 'Arab Springs" served 
as a reminder of the risks inherent in a young 
population with no prospects. 
• Young people at the core of the 
employment challenge 
The scale of dema nd for jobs for young people 
clearly reveals the extent of the problem. To -
day. across the whole of Africa. more than 20 
m illion young people (aged between 15 and 24) 
are looking for their fi rstjobs or for income-ge-
nerating activities. This annual cohort will rapi-
dly increase to reach 33 million in 2030. With a 
15-year horizon. this figure is nota projection: 
this future workforce is already born. 
By 2030, a total of 440 million young men and 
women will need to find an activity to support 
themselves and their families. This is equiva-
lent to the current population of the United 
States and Mexico. Of course. the distribution 
of these young people between the countries 
of the continent reflects differences in the 
size and age structure of the population. and 
the Nigerian economy will need to absorb 
the highest numbers (70 mill ion). followed by 
Ethiopia. DRC and Egypt. 
• What are the job opportunities 
for young people? 
Labour absorption capacities depend on the 
structure of activity within economies. on avai-
lable resources. physical and human capital and 
growth dynamics. At present. the continent is 
still marked by its high level of agricultural acti-
vity. The exceptions to this are North Africa. 
the Gulf of Guinea oil-producing countries 
and South Africa. Informai activities - in other 
words those that are unregulated and unre-
ported - are predominant and are concen-
t rated in family farming and very small busi-
nesses in the craft. trade and building sectors. 
Employment in formai services and industry is 
generally very limited. As a result. pay is low and 
jobs offer little or no social protection. 
ln order to absorb their cohorts of young 
people, the African economies will need to 
diversify and to develop labour-intensive sec-
tors. This shift calls for appropriate public poli-
cies focusing first on training. which should be 
vocational and must respond to needs. and 
next on the development of infrastructure and 
services (communications. transport. energy. 
financial sector) that facilitate investment and 
the emergence of new activities. 
The whole continent. and in particular sub-
Saharan Africa. has considerable capacity for 
growth linked to this burgeoning labour force 
and also to the extent of physical resources 
still available. Developing these capacit ies will 
depend on technical choices t hat are condu-
cive to employment. in other words that 
prioritise labour over capital (mechanisation. 
automation) while ensuring decent working 
conditions (related to arduous work. pay. and 
protection). These strengths can be directed 
at meeting demand from the global economy 
and especially from the booming African inter-
nai market. which will have an additional 1.3 bil-
lion people by 2050. 
However. although the African economies 
have begun to diversify. it is clear that the 
structure of activity will not change radically 
in the short or medium term. and that the 
industrial and high value-added service sec-
tors will not provide the hundreds of millions 
of jobs required by 2030. Agricultural activities 
and very small businesses will inevitably have 
a key role to play and the public authorities 
will need to take account of their potential for 
development. modernisation and innovation. 
This calls for appropriate policies on credit. 
information and technical support. but also on 
more secure economic and institutional envi-
ronments. Moreover. it implies improving the 
poor working condit ions and status of young 
workers. which are one of the reasons young 
people shun this type of activity. especially in 
rural areas. Finally. it requires greater recogni-
tion of agriculture and skilled crafts in the me-
dia. at school and from policy makers. which 
is a prerequisite for meeting the challenge of 
youth employment. 
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MEGACITIES AND ARCHIPELAGOS: 
AN EMERGING URBAN FRAMEWORK 
The extraordinary urban growth that charac-
terises the whole of Africa is producing dense 
networks of towns that constitute urban archi-
pelagos. But the limitations of întermediate 
urbanisation, despite the emergence of sma/1 
towns in rural areas, are hampering territorial 
development and the diversification of local 
econom,es. 
• The emergence 
of vast urban clusters 
Huge urban clusters are developing on the 
African continent. ln the Nile Valley in Egypt. 
Cairo. with a population of almost 15.7 million 
people in 2010. is the biggest metropolitan 
area on the continent. On the Mediterra-
nean coast. a highly urbanised coastal strip 
stretches from Tripoli in Libya (1.9) to Agadir 
in Morocco (0.8) and includes several large 
cit ies: Algiers (3). Rabat (1.8). and Tunis (1). ln 
West Africa. urban population density is high 
from the Gulf of Guinea coast to t he Sahel 
region. Nigeria is still by far the most urbanised 
country, with the major cities of Lagos (10 Sl. 
Onitsha (6.3), Kano (3 1) and Ibadan (2 4) 
Large cities are located throughout the rest of 
the region: Abidjan (4.3) in Côte d'Ivoire. Accra 
(3.6) and Kumasi (2.2) in Ghana. Bamako in Mali 
(2.3) and Dakar in Senegal (2.6). ln the Ethio-
pian Highlands. a dense urban network has 
developed around the capital Addis Ababa (3). 
ln the Great Lakes region. Kampala in Uganda 
(1.7) and Nairobi in Kenya (4.4) are large cities 
that are connected via networks of small and 
medium-sized towns and regional capitals re-
sulting in a conurbation in western Kenya with 
3.9 m illion people on the border with Uganda. 
ln the northern part of South Africa and in 
the extreme south of Mozambique. an urban 
network has developed around Johannesburg 
(7.2). stretching towards Bloemfontein in the 
interior of the country and to Durban (3) and 
Maputo (1.9) on the coast. 
ln addition to these dense urban clusters. cor-
ridors of urbanisation are emerging between 
Lake Chad and the Ethiopian Highlands. along 
the Bantu line between the borders of Came-
roon and Nigeria and the Great Lakes. as 1,vell 
as along the railway line and roads leading to 
the m ining regions of the Copperbelt. from 
Pointe-Noire in the Republic of the Congo 
to Lubumbashi in DRC. crossing Zambia and 
Zimbabwe before reaching the lndian Ocean 
at Beira in Mozambique. Finally. more isolated 
large cities such as Cape Town in South Africa 
(3 3). Luanda in Angola (5.2) and Khartoum in 
Sudan (4.5) result in polarisation in their sur-
rounding regions. 
• Between macrocephaly and 
multipolar frameworks 
Urban networks are strongly marked by their 
past. Precolonial urban frameworks were deve-
loped by large urban civilisations turning their 
back on the coasts. without the constraints 
of state boundaries. North Africa developed 
its urban network within the Mediterranean 
trade area (Arabs. Ottomans. Persians. etc.). 
The urban systems from t he colonial period 
then adopted a "comb-like" structure oriented 
perpendicular to the coasts. with a main town 
that was most often a railway terminus and 
a port for exports. which subsequently be-
came the capital. Nowadays. urban networks 
have become so dense that this spatial 
structure is less and less clear. Current trends 
are marked by the proliferation of thousands of 
small settlements that emerge from the large 
rural towns under t he pressure of population 
growth. the densification of road networks and 
the tightening of state administrative proce-
dures. 
Af rica has a wide range of different urban fra-
meworks. for which the hierarchy of cities and 
the degree of concentrat ion is assessed ac-
cording to the index of primacy. ln North Africa. 
urban frameworks are relatively balanced. with 
the exception of the megacity of Cairo. Two 
contrasting types of urban frameworks are 
seen in sub-Saharan Africa. 
First. the network is polarised or even crushed 
by a large city inherited from the colonial pe-
riod, which has often become the state capi-
tal (Liberia, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire. Mali. Maurita-
nia: Angola. Central African Republic; Burundi. 
Eritrea. Ethiopia. etc.). 
Second. the national urban network is domi-
nated by several large cities o riginating in 
the urban f rameworks inherited from the 
past. Ghana, Burkina Faso. Cape Verde and 
Cameroon have bicephalous urban systems. 
Elsewhere. two or three large cities dominate 
the country (Equatorial Guinea. Chad. Congo: 
Kenya. Malawi. South Africa). Nigeria stands 
out for having one of the lowest indexes of pri-
macy (1 .7) due to the presence of Onitsha and 
Kano. ln ail cases. macrocephaly is reflected 
in national urban systems by a relative lack of 
medium-sized towns. 
• Bottom-up urbanisation and 
connected urban archipelagos 
Far from being contradictory. the dynamics of 
large cities and small towns are in fact connec-
ted since a large proportion of small settle-
ments proliferate on the outskirts of cities. This 
trend results in an urban network o rganised in 
archipelagos benefitting from the increasing 
importance of major roads. as seen in the Gulf 
of Guinea. throughout Nigeria. the Ethiopian 
Highlands. the Nairobi-Kampala corridor. the 
Great Lakes and South Africa. 
Emerging Africa is currently one of large cities 
that are connected to global urban networks. 
But this connection will only drive develop-
ment if it is accompanied by a rebalancing of 
urban f rameworks. The limitations of interme-
diate urbanisation remain a major obstacle to 
the densification of urban-rural linkages, the 
essence of rural economic diversification. This 
"reappropriation of territories" in response to 
a metropolisation process that has become 
difficult t o manage is the key to a new deve-
lopment model. The future development of 
urban networks will therefore depend on the 
densification of rural areas that are the scene 
of in situ. emerging urbanisation processes 
capable of providing states and regional enti-
t ies with a robust urban framework and do-
mestic economy. as long as public policies take 
into account the reality on the ground and not 
just the capital cit ies. 
GLOSSARY 
Urban framework: al/ hierarchicafly organised cities 
and their areas of influence within a given territory. 
The index of primacy: cafcufated by dividing the popu-
lation size of the rank 1 city by that of the rank 2 city. 
Megacity: a very large metropolitan area with severa/ 
million inhabitants. The UN set the population thres -
hold at 1 O million people (Cairo and Lagos for Africa). 
Macrocephaly: the excessive size of one or seve-
ral cities at the top of the urban hierarchy in a given 
territory 
Cathy Chatel, Jacques lmbernon, 
François Moriconi-Ebrard 
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MIGRATION DYNAMICS: CONTRASTED 
PATTERNS, DIVERSITY AND POTENTIAL 
A large share of African international migra-
tions occurs in Africa. Remittances are signi-
ficant for many countries and their amount 
is directly related to the destination country 
of migrants. Further new migration dyna-
mics reshape national spaces and craft a new 
emerging African rurality. Migrations must be 
considered as an integral part of development 
policies 
• Most international migration 
occurs within the continent 
Total international African migrat ion is largely 
motivated by the search for economic oppor-
tunities. and also by insecurity and conflicts. as 
well as environmental and natural causes such 
as recurrent floods and droughts. ln 2015. 
nearly 33 mill ion Af ricans were living outside 
their home country but more than one out 
of every two international migrants migrated 
within Africa. This overall figure masks howe-
ver sharp differences: while North Africans 
migrate outside the continent (90%). mostly 
to Europe (45%) and the Middle East (35°..ii). 
Sub-Saharan Africans move first within Africa 
(nearly 75%) and to neighboring countries. 
West Africa. East Africa and. to a lesser extent. 
Southern Africa are the most dynamic regions 
in terms of sending and receiving countries. 
with Côte d'Ivoire, South Africa. Nigeria, Kenya 
and Ethiopia being the top 5 receiving ones. 
International data neither capture the increa-
sing undocumented m igration nor the signi-
ficant dynamics of circular or non-residential 
migrations between countries. lntra-African 
migrations are partly facilitated by free circula-
tion regimes linked to regional economic corn-
m unities. albeit Southern Africa stands out as a 
region without a formai migration governance 
regime. African migrations are also linked to 
the porous nature of borders that facilitate 
movement of people and informai cross-bor-
der trade. Overall. the high level of circulations 
result from the expansion over t ime of kin and 
family networks. boosted by improved infras-
tructure, ICTs and communication networks. 
These m igrations create new functional 
spaces at the regional level whose limits result 
from social and economic networks. 
International African migrants are also the 
youngest in the world. with a median age of 29 
compared with 39 globally. This specific pat-
tern reflects the continent's demo-economic 
features: its fast growing population and the 
related needs for employment in a context 
where opportunities do not meet the scale 
of the demand. This is particularly the case in 
cit ies characterized by the importance of the 
info rmai sector in providing low- income jobs. A 
better life elsewhere is therefore an alternative 
supported by information networks. 
• Returns to international 
migration strongly depend 
on the destination 
International migrations have a strong im-
pact. both on national economies and local 
livelihoods. through the remittances sent back 
home. ln 2015. Africa countries received an 
estimated amount of $64 bill ion from abroad 
(11°/o of the global remittances). 83°..ii came 
from the rest of the world ($53 billion) and 
1 7% from within the continent ( $11 bil lion). 
This sharp difference in returns to migration 
contrasts with the distribution of African mi-
grants within and outside Africa (about 50 to 
50%). A basic ratio suggests that migration 
outside the continent provides incomes that 
are over five times higher than between Afri-
can countries ($3900 to $700 per migrant) -
reflecting a difference in wages between high 
and upper m iddle income economies and low 
income countries. 
Most remittances from outside Africa flow 
into North Africa (49%). where international 
transfers cou nt for nearly all the total amount. 
and into West Africa (41 o/o). Major receiving 
countries are Nigeria. Egypt. and Morocco. 
The United Kingdom is the top remitter to 
SSA followed by France. and Saudi Arabia to 
North Africa. A couple of Sub-Sahara African 
countries also mostly specialize in migrations 
from outside Africa (South Africa. Kenya. and 
Ethiopia) 
West Africa received the highest intra-Afri-
can remittances (79%). with Nigeria recei -
ving the most (around 60°/o). Most o f these 
rem ittances to West A fric a were intra -regiona 1 
(plus Cameroon). This feature is similar in the 
other regions with the major remitters sending 
transfers vvithin the region. These regional 
patterns. the high cross-borders movements 
and informai channel remittances suggest 
that the amounts of intra-African remittances 
are certainly underestimated. both in cash 
remittances and in the form of goods (in many 
cases transfers in kind represent a significant 
part of solidarity between and within fam ilies). 
Mainstreaming m igration into the develop-
ment agenda could greatly maximize the po-
tential and impact of remittances for develop-
ment. The Post-2015 Agenda should help to 
channel migrant resources into development 
finance - through diaspora bonds. recruitment 
and transfer cost reduction. new technologies 
(e-transfers) However. households' remit-
tances are private savings and should in any 
case be considered as a substitute to govern-
ment commitment and public contribution to 
development. 
• Domestic migrations 
contribute to the shaping of new 
territorial dynamics 
Beyond international dynamics. renewed and 
diversified migration patterns have thrived 
over the last decades between capital cities. 
small and regional towns and their rural hinter-
lands. These circular dynamics testify to the 
blurred lim its between rural and urban liveli-
hoods. and the importance of rural-urban lin-
kages that characterize the emerging African 
new rurality. The static categories of "rural" 
and "urban" no longer capture the mixed lifes-
tyles and socio -economic behaviors related to 
intensifying rural-urban relations. 
Existing migrations support the diversification 
of households' livelihoods and the access to 
employment opportunities. They strengthen 
the role of small towns and intermediate cities 
and local and regional dynamics. This new 
territorial reality shaped by m igrations must 
be a matter of concern for public policies, to 
facil itate a better match of interventions with 
ocal needs and the im provement of existing 
synergies. 
Sara Mercandalli and Christopher C. Nshimbi 
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OPTIONS FOR ECONOMIC TRANSITION: 
FROM SECTORAL APPROACHES TO THE 
TERRITORIAL MODEL 
Despite recent yet fragile economic growth, 
structural change in Africa has been slow and 
the continent is faced with the need for more 
inclusive and sustainable growth. This chal-
lenge implies rethinking development strate-
gies and adopting multi-sectoral and place-
based approaches. 
• Africa's diversity 
Since the beginning of the century. Africa has 
been marked by high economic growth that 
was not affected by the financial crisis of 2008-
2009. which impacted the other parts of the 
world. This growth was driven by the expansion 
of domestic demand linked to slow improve-
ments in the standard of living and to popula-
tion growth. but also by the export boom and 
the rise in prices of the continent's abundant 
commodities. This trend is however changing 
because of the slowdown in growth in Asia and 
in global demand for mining and oil products. 
This observation nevertheless masks a variety 
of regional and national situations. Over and 
above the political crises that have affected 
or are stil l affecting several countries. with 
major impacts on their domestic growth. dif-
ferent trajectories of structural change are 
observed in Africa. First. it is important to dis-
t inguish the two extremities of the continent 
- the five North African countries and South 
Africa -. which have annual per capita income 
of between USD 3 000 and 7 000. diversified 
economies. high levels of urbanisation and 
low population growth (between 1.5 and 2.5% 
per year). Next. "middle Africa" - sub-Saharan 
Africa minus South Africa - has 38 countries 
out of 48 where annual per capita income is 
less than USD 1 500. where economies are 
predominantly based on agricultural and m i-
ning activities (vvhich exceed 40o/o of GDP in 
25 countries. whereas the manufacturing sec-
tor only exceeds 15% in seven countries). and 
finally where the population is still largely rural 
with a population growth rate of more than 
2.5% year (and more than 3% in 12 countries). 
Thus. although sub-Saharan Africa accounts 
for 75% of the African population. it corres-
ponds to only 4 5 % of the conti nent's GDP. This 
very specific situation is the result of the sub-
continent's late integration into the global eco-
nomy. of a restrictive colonial rule causing ter-
ritorial fragmentation that was enhanced after 
independence. and of recent. rentier urbani-
sation relying on administration and raw mate-
rials. Sub-Saharan Africa is marked by urbani-
sation without industrialisation. an exceptional 
situation in the economic history of the world. 
Despite these common characteristics. some 
countries that have no mining activities (espe-
cially in EastAfrica) have succeeded in initiating 
their economic diversification with an increase 
in experts of higher value-added products. 
• Options for more inclusive 
and sustainable growth 
More than ever. the challenge now is to build 
momentum for growth that will provide decent 
j obs for the 440 million young people who will 
enter the j ob m arket over the next 15 years. 
while taking into account adaptation to climate 
change and the need for natural resource ma-
nagement. 
Several sectoral options are being discussed in 
order to identify the best potential for growth. 
lndustrial development. which has traditionally 
been a major source of jobs in other parts of 
the world. remains the reference. New possi-
bil ities exist. especially with light industrialisa-
tion in some segments of global value chains 
and rising labour costs in Asia. But there are 
still many structural obstacles (infrastructure. 
skills. services) to meeting this challenge in the 
medium term . 
Agriculture remains a priority sector since it 
still employs the majority of workers. lts deve-
lopment provides well-known leverage which. 
through the steady increase in agricultural 
income. enables growth in rural demand and 
the graduai diversification of activit ies. The 
agricultural development model adopted is 
crucial here. at the risk of favouring capitalis-
tic options based on large. highly mechanised 
farms. to the detriment of more labour-in-
tensive approaches based on family farming. 
lncreasing agricultural income remains a key 
issue that requires proactive public policies. 
The shift towards a service economy, "leap-
frogging" industrialisation. is under discussion. 
But this option will struggle to meet demand 
for jobs in sectors that are themselves subject 
to international competit ion. Green growth, 
based on low-carbon technologies. using 
more labour and developing environmental 
services. could be another alternative. but the 
specifics have yet to be defined. 
• Mobilising territorial resources 
More t han ever. the scale of the challenge 
implies reinvesting in effective development 
strategies that take into account the sectoral 
and geographic distribution of activities and 
people. and that build on existing development 
potential at the local. national and regional 
levels. lt is unlikely that the option of export-
based development. to which the Asian model 
owes its success. would be replicable in the 
new international context. 
This change of perspective implies moving 
away f rom the excessive segmentation of 
public policies. with their fragmented sectoral 
objectives. in order to unlock the potential for 
territorial development: better understanding 
the assets and identifying and removing obs-
tacles based on concerted analyses resulting 
in strategies for action. 
ln particular; this approach implies reducing 
the territorial asymmetries inherited from the 
past. with urban structure imbalances infavour 
of capitals. where small and medium-sized 
towns are unable to actas a real driving force 
due to a lack of infrastructure and services. 
lnvestment in public goods at this level of the 
urban structure could potentially unlock local 
dynamics. strengthen the linkages between 
urban and rural areas required for diversifica-
tion. and develop the very specific resources 
to each territory 
Bruno Losch 
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REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN AFRICA: 
OVERLAP, COLLABORATION AND ACTION 
For Africa, with its 1.15 billion inhabitants in 
2015, a market of 54 countries and a young, 
rapidly growing population, the opportunities 
are great. But the continent's transforma-
tion and development must be inclusive and 
African regional organisations have a key role 
to play in integrating the different regions into 
the process of change. 
• New places for public policy 
making? 
The regional integration process is generally 
economically and politically mot ivated. Against 
the backdrop of globalisation. the states are 
seeking to increase their influence in interna-
tional negotiations. The complexity of deve-
lopment processes and environmental issues. 
their cross-border nature and the increase 
in tensions and conflicts are also driving the 
states to cooperate within the regîonal areas 
under construction. African integration gained 
momentum in 2002. when the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) becam e t he African Union 
(AU). But there are m any regional o rganisa-
tions in Africa that fo rm a complex and dyna-
mic architecture. These organisations overlap 
and some countries are members of several of 
them. such as the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. which belongs to ECCAS. COMESA 
and SADC. or Uganda. which belongs to CO-
MESA. IGAD and EAC. This complexity some-
times hampers coordination initiatives. since 
each organisation applies different standards 
and controls. as with UEMOA and ECOWAS. 
Today. the African Union's integration strate-
gy is based on the use of Regional Economie 
Communit ies (RECs) as "milestones" leading 
to the creation of a single continental trade 
bloc. However, although the Abuja Treaty pro-
vides for the creation of five RE Cs correspon-
ding to the five regions initially recognised by 
the OAU. there are still eight RE Cs at present 
Few regional o rganisations truly benefit from 
the transfer of sovereignty: this is the case. but 
still very partially, for COMESA and UEMOA. 
SADC and ECOWAS are playing an increa-
singly important role in terms of peace and 
security. ECOWAS and EAC have introduced 
a community passport to facilitate the move-
m ent of people and to build a regional identity. 
Sorne smaller regional organisations. which 
include a number of states for a specific pro-
blem. have made real progress in term s of 
coordination. such as the Organisation pour 
la m ise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal (OMVS -
Senegal River development organisation) for 
water management ln addition to these re-
gional treaties. informai cross-border integra-
tion zones are being created in Africa. An eco-
nomic zone is being developed around Nigeria. 
with cross-border trade. especially in food pro -
ducts. The Sikasso-Khorogo-Bobo Dioulasso 
zone, which straddles three countries but has 
cul tural unity. is contributing to informai inte-
gration. And large-scale transnational urban 
basins are taking shape. such as the one in the 
Gulf of Guinea. which stretches from Abidjan in 
Côte d'Ivoire to Port Harcourt in Nigeria. 
• Progress in regional integration 
ln order to evaluate progress made in terms 
of regional integration. the African Union 
Commission examines 16 indicators reflecting 
the Africa Regional lntegration Index in five key 
fields: trade integration. productive integra-
tion. regional infrastructure, the free m ove-
ment of people. and financial and macroeco-
nomic integration. The examples of financial 
and macroeconomic integration and the free 
movement of people show that. depending 
on the cri terion selected. the gaps between 
regional economic areas vary in terms of per-
formance. 
To strengthen Africa's position in a context of 
globalisation. continental organisations have 
been created under the OAU and later the AU. 
The establishment of NEPAD in 2001 reflects 
the continent's political will to follow "a path of 
sustainable growth and development. and, at 
the same time. to participate actively in the 
world economy and body polit ic". 
• Agriculture and rural areas: 
leverage for integration 
Sorne regional organisations have developed 
specific policies for the agricultural sector: this 
is the case of the UEMOA Agricultural Policy 
(UAP) in 2002 and of ECOWAS with ECOWAP 
in 2005. NEPAD. with the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP). is continuing these coordination 
efforts on agricultural and rural policies. Reco-
gnising that the majority o f Af ricans live in rural 
areas. NEPAD's "Rural Futures" programme 
seeks to boost action in sectors that drive 
growth: infrastructure. human resources. 
agriculture. environment. culture. science and 
technology On the assumption of an increase 
in productivity and in agricultural production 
through market integration. these agricultural 
and rural policy frameworks increasingly take 
into account the importance of territories, 
with decentralisation and greater stakeholder 
involvement in natural resource management. 
Rural areas in Africa and their sm all towns are 
undoubtedly a basis for quieter development 
than the growth of large cities. but also a soun-
der one for the African continent. 
ECOWAS - Economie Community of West African 
States 
CEMAC - Communauté économique et moné-
taire des Etats de l~frique Centrale (Monetary and 
Economie Community of Central Africa) 
CEN-SAO - Communauté des États sahélo·saha-
riens (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) 
COMESA - Common Market for Eastern and Sou-
thern Africa 
EAC • East African Community I Communauté est -
ilfrir.aine 
IGAD- lntergovernmental Authorityon Devefopment 
NEPAO - New Partnership for Africa's Oeve/opment 
SAOC - Southern African Oevelopment Community 
AU- African Union 
UE1'v/OA - Union économique et monétaire Ouest 
Africaine (West African Economie and Monetary 
Union) 
UMA - Union du Maghreb arabe (Arab Maghreb 
Union) 
Jacques lmbernon, Denis Pesche 
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DECENTRALISATION IN AFRICA: 
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RURAL AREAS? 
ln Africa, as in the rest of the world, decentrali-
sation is a key e/ement of the institutional and 
politica/ reforms undertaken since the 1990s. 
The decentralisation process is on/y just be-
ginning to materialise in terms of the fïnancial 
and budgetary autonomy of the local authori-
ties. However, decentra/isation remains pro-
mising for rural areas with authorities that 
have considerable governance potential for 
rebalancing investment, ensuring regional 
equity and managing tension and crises linked 
to resources. 
• Decentralisation: 
a relatively recent process 
With the establishment of local political and 
administrative authorities. each with their own 
powers and led by local officiais. decentrali-
sation is associated with the idea of better 
governance. By stimulating local development 
and bringing together policy makers and ci-
t izens. it holds the promise of new legitimacy 
for public action, which has been undermined 
by the structural adjustment policies of the 
1980s and 1990s. Moreover. it is supposed to 
have a positive effect on stability. development 
and democracy. For rural areas in particular. 
decentralisation may foster better articulation 
between urban and rural territories. by building 
on mobility and trade between rural villages 
and intermediate towns. helping to boost 
the local economy through greater proximity 
between private init iatives. social dynamics 
and local decision-makers. 
Many different factors are important in explai-
ning the diversity of decentralisation dyna-
mics depending on the country: the colonial 
legacy, institutional federal ism. or the political 
party system. The reality of decentralisation 
also depends on the quality of the devolution 
of the state and its administrat ion or of the 
general functioning of the state in the case of 
a federal system: in both cases, the articula-
tion between the local and central authorities 
is a decisive factor in planning the future of 
these rural territories. The combined analysis 
of several criteria makes it possible to examine 
the legal reality of decentralisation. but also its 
financial reality. 
Local taxat ion is a good indicator of decen-
tralisation and of the role actually played by 
the local authorities in the development of 
their territory. The share of local revenue and 
expenditure in global public expenditure clearly 
illustrates the fact that. with the exception of a 
few countries (Tanzania, South Africa. Uganda. 
Rwanda). decentralisation remains tentative 
and relatively ineffective. The local authori-
ties rarely have the budgetary autonomy that 
would enable them to set up their own taxation 
system and they are generally very restricted in 
their expenditure. remaining largely under the 
supervision of central states. Consequently. 
the impression of greater decentralisation in 
some East African countries suggested by 
the maps should be balanced against the fact 
that the local authorities have limited powers in 
comparison with some French-speaking West 
African countries. 
With decentralisation. the government of a 
country generally operates on three levels: 
central. regional and local. ln rural areas. the re-
gions (or provinces) sometimes have powers in 
terms of agricultural or rural policies. The local 
authorities are playing an increasingly important 
role in the field of natural resource management. 
even if. for problematic issues such as property 
rights. the status of land and access to land, 
the central authorities continue to play a deci-
sive role in large-scale land allocations. 
• Decentralisation: an 
opportunity to be consolidated 
Decentralisation is often perceived and pre-
sented as being able to play an important 
role in improving the living conditions of rural 
populations. through better access to basic 
services (health. education). but also through 
productive investment and rural infrastructure 
capable of boosting the local economy (roads. 
warehouses. local markets). lt implies greater 
involvement of local people in their own deve-
lopment. which o~en varies according to the 
nature of the political regime. 
Paradoxically. by giving po11vers to the local 
authorities for natural resource management 
and in particular for land tenure. decentrali -
sation may contribute to "locally centralising" 
powers that were previously exercised by the 
villages or customary authorities. lt is not unu-
sual to find that decentralisation has increased 
the influence of several powerful local stake-
holders. often officiais. without opening up 
opportunities for people to participate in local 
affairs. 
Today. almost all countries have a legal and 
constitutional framework for decentralisation 
and the challenge is to strengthen the exis-
ting local authorit ies to enable them to sti-
mulate innovative governance that facilitates 
territorial development. Another challenge is 
to improve synergies between economic and 
social dynamics. the local authorities and the 
different state components (ministries and 
administrations) acting in the territory. But the 
increasing mobility of products. information 
and people makes governance structures 
more complex. 
Decentralisation dynamics are also part of 
change processes concerning the role of the 
state and the increasing role played by regio-
nal economic organisations. The progress 
of decentralisation. supported by local social 
dynamics. territorial cohesion and socio-eco-
nom ic development. may provide a response 
to growing tension surrounding the use of 
resources. and may even make it possible to 
anticipate or prevent potential conflicts linked 
to the demographic and political restructuring 
underway in Africa. 
The institutional environment of towns and local au-
thorities is evaluated based on criteria concerning five 
fields - local governance. local capacities. financial 
autonomy, local efficiency and national institutional 
env,ronment. The first map provides a representation 
of the formai progress of decentralisation by combi-
ning this progress in legal and constitutional terms (3 
criteria} with the "reality" of decentralisation in terms 
of financial autonomy /2 criteria). The second map 
illustrates the favourable or unfavourable nature of 
the institutional environment of the local authorities 
b,i.~P.ri on thP. total mark8 obtainP.ri for P.ac.h of thP. 1 O 
criteria (CGLU. Cities Alliance. 2015). 
Denis Pesche and Amadou Diop 
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WHICH PATHWAYS 
FOR AGRICULTURE BY 2050? 
By 2050, some African countries wi/1 be able 
to leverage growth in their economies to bols-
ter agricultural production through support 
policies, while others will have to resort to ap-
plying social measures to the sector in order to 
maintain stability and territorial balances. 
• Agriculture 
and structural change 
The agriculture and food sector is ohen held 
up as an example of an activity that will be ca-
pable of absorbing surplus labour in the future 
and becoming a major contributor to natio -
nal wealth. This position implies that struc-
tural change - characterised by a decrease 
in the share of farming in employment and 
global wealth - could be deferred for several 
decades. or that Africa could take a different 
development path to the traditional trajectory 
of change. 
Leveraging the agri-food sector also assumes 
that farmers will be able to make a decent 
living from their activity. yet access to land will 
become increasingly difficult as a result of high 
population growth and climate change could 
reduce the potential for higher yields. There 
are more and more obstacles to aligning farm 
incarne with other sectors of activity. Howe-
ver. incarne gaps between sectors have as 
much impact as disparities in access to social 
infrastructure when it cornes to determining 
m igration dynamics. especially between rural 
and urban areas. and they can thus contribute 
to territorial imbalances. 
• Productivity gains offset by 
ttie rapidly growing labour force 
Optimistic projections for 2050 based on 
"potentially cultivable land" anticipate a pos-
sible 80°/o increase in cropped areas in Africa 
relative to 2010. According to this hypothesis 
and with an estimated 330 million more people 
entering the agricultural labour force. land 
available per farm worker could fall from slightly 
more than 1 ha on average to around O. 7 ha. ln 
some countries. pressure for land could result 
in land per worker being more tha n halved. 
Under these conditions, leveraging agriculture 
implies ensuring ample scope for increasing 
yields or cropping int ensity. Irrigation poten-
tial is certainly high, but climate change will 
affect the productivity of land and marginal 
land will also be used for cropland expansion. 
By applying green revolution solutions to areas 
currently cultivated. o r adopting more inten-
sive technology packages for less productive 
land. we obtain similar labour productivity pro-
jections of around 4 200 dollars in purchasing 
power parity per worker/ year by 2050. or an 
increase of 400/o in relation to the 3 000 dollars 
per worker/year in 2010. This outlook seems 
encouraging at first sight and would mean agri-
culture could contribute to stabilising balances 
between economic sectors. But anticipated 
changes in national econom ies must also be 
ta ken into account. as this growth corresponds 
to an increase of only 0 .9o/o of annual income. 
which is low. lt also masks some major dispari -
ties: in 27 countries. farm incarne would more 
than double. in nine it would decrease. and 
16 countries would find themselves 
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somewhere in between. ln the most critical 
cases. migratory pressures. risks of shortages 
and poverty cou Id dramatically increase. 
• Different trajectories requiring 
differe11tiated treatment 
Incarne convergence between the agricultu-
ral sector and the rest of the economy will be 
very unequal. ln a quarter of African countries. 
gaps between farm incarne and global income 
varied by a factor of 1 to 4 or more in 2010. 
According to our projections. this gap could 
concern twice as many countries by 2050. 
However. the number of countries with farm 
income levels higher than 75% of all workers' 
incarne would remain stable (12). ln a small 
number of advanced transition countries. 
or countries that have yet to maxim ise their 
agricultural potential. the situation of farmers 
could even im prove in relation to the rest of 
society. provided that there is an enabling ins-
titutional environment. But when incarne gaps 
coincide with a reduction in the absolute value 
of agricultural incarne. we can expect serious 
difficulties ensuring the agricultural sector 
plays its expected role as a provider of employ-
ment and a regulator of migration movements 
and rural depopulation. 
The historical path of the most developed 
countries combines income convergence 
and agricultural population decline. Sorne 
countries in the more advanced stages of 
demographic transition and economic diver-
sification could follow this path. For a minority 
of intermediate countries where population 
growth has begun to slow. or where pressure 
for land is relatively low. we project more fa-
vourable paths for the agricultural sector with 
incarne convergence. in spite of a growing 
agricultural population. Finally. the majority of 
countries are on a worrying course towards 
incarne divergence betvveen sectors, while the 
number of farmers will increase. For some of 
these countries. global economic growth and 
average incarne growth will put the agricultural 
population at the bottom of the league. 
lt will therefore be necessary to define speci-
fic measures to support farm ing populations 
that should be made possible by the global 
increase in purchasing power. This would pro-
vide the flexibility required to stimulate agri-
cultural market growth. to the benefit of pro-
ducers. especially through an increase in the 
consumption of higher value-added products 
(fruit and vegetables. animal products). This 
context would also be more conducive to the 
implementation of more ambitious agricultu -
ral price policies. However. for many countries. 
only social measures will enable farmers and 
their families to maintain an acceptable stan-
dard of living. This approach will determ ine 
social stability and territorial balances. 
Benoit Faivre-Dupaigre 
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Fig. 9. Major agricultural exporting countries in 2014 
Source Comtiade 20l5 
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AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: 
MIXED RESULTS WELL BELOW 
THEIR POTENTIAL 
Exports of agricultural products now account 
for on/y 1.3% of ail African exports, a long way 
behind those of oil, gas and ore. They are ne-
vertheless critical for a number of countries, 
where they exceed 50% of total export value. 
Heavy dependence on two or three produets 
is the rule in many countries and a source of 
weakness. The /ow /evel of processing for 
these products remains a challenge at a time 
when trade partners are diversifying. 
• Major differences 
between countries 
After an overall decrease since 2000 (when it 
stood at 20°/o). the share of agricultural pro-
ducts in total African exports of goods and 
services now seems to have stabil ised at 
between 10 and 15%. with variations accor-
ding to the mining boom. and even seems to 
be gaining some ground. The sharp fall in non-
agricultural commodity prices over the last 
two years will undoubtedly enhance the role of 
these exports in t rade. 
The average values nevertheless mask consi-
derable disparities within Africa. ranging from 
less than 1 °Ai to more than 80o/o of exports 
depending on the country. ln the oil producing 
countries. agricultural products are margina-
lised or even virtually absent f rom exports. At 
the other end of the spectrum. agricultural 
products account for the majority of exports in 
around 15 countries. especially in East Africa. 
but also in Malawi. Benin and the Central Afri-
can Republic. 
Africa still makes a limited contribution to in-
t ernational agricultural markets (3.8°/o) and has 
not recovered its market share of the 1960s. 
The contributions of the different African 
countries differ greatly: the 10 largest expor-
ters account for three quarters of all agricultu-
ral exports. The leaders are South Africa. Côte 
d'Ivoire. Egypt and Morocco. which all belong to 
different sub-regions. The heavy dependence 
on a limited number of products is another 
key characteristic of the structure of Af rican 
exports. For most countries. 50 to 75°Ai of 
exports are concentrated on two types of pro-
ducts. Cocoa accounts for 65o/o of agricultural 
exports in Côte d'Ivoire and 50% of those in 
Ghana. Half of all Egyptian exports are based 
on fruits. vegetables and cotton. and 78°Ai of 
Moroccan exports are based on fruits. vege-
tables and fishery products. This concentra-
t ion of exports on just a few products is o~en 
inherited from the imperial self- sufficiency 
policies of the European colonialist countries 
in t he first half of the 20th century. which tar-
geted a small number of product s including 
coffee. cocoa and tea. oilseeds and fruits. This 
historical specialisation is surprisingly endu -
ring, although it has not prevented the emer-
gence of new exports (vegetables. flowers and 
fishery products). 
• A slight reduction in the 
coffee-cocoa-fruit specialisation 
The structure of agricultural exports (2012-
2014 l by product type is still dominated by the 
"tropical beverages" category. in other words 
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coffee. cocoa and tea. as well as by fruits and 
vegetables, each category accounting for 20% 
of total agricultural exports: but the relative im-
portance of these products is diminishing. as 
they represented 2 6°/o and 21 % respectively 
for the 2009- 2011 period. The balance has 
shi~ed in favour of animal products (basically 
fishery). timber. and oilseeds. 
Fruits and vegetables slightly exceeded tropi-
cal beverages in terms of agricultural exports. 
The traditional sectors are bananas and pi-
neapples in the tropical zones and citrus f ruits 
in the Mediterranean region. But exports of 
fresh vegetables or fruits. such as mangos 
and papayas. are rapidly developing. The whole 
continent is concerned by these fruits and ve-
getables. which are usually a high value-added 
sector. 
Cocoa. which alone accounts for two thirds of 
the tropical beverages group. is highly concen-
trated in the Gulf of Guinea countries (Côte 
d'Ivoire is the world's number one producer 
and Ghana is vying with lndonesia for second 
place. followed by Nigeria and Cameroonl. Al-
though it is making some progress. as in Côte 
d'Ivoire. local processing is still a very weak 
point. African coffee production has been pro -
gressively marginalised in countries such as 
Kenya. Côte d'Ivoire and Angola. Tea exports 
are mostly from Kenya. which is one of the 
global market leaders. ahead of Vietnam. Sri 
Lanka and China. 
Oilseeds. a traditional African export sector 
along with groundnuts. sesame and oil palms. 
declined in the 1990s. before benefiting in the 
last 10 years from growing demand from the 
emerging Asian countries (China and lndia in 
particular). mostly for palm oil. whose produc-
tion has been revived (Nigeria. Côte d'Ivoire. 
Central Africa). especially with Asian investors. 
New export sectors are also being established. 
such as sesame in Ethiopia and cashews in 
Côte d'Ivoire. which has become the world's 
leading exporter of raw cashew nuts. Africa 
provides almost half of all raw nut production. 
but loses out on kernel exports to Asian pro-
ducer countries (lndia and Vietnam), which are 
also importers. Olive oil is also being revived in 
Tunisia and Morocco. driven by new demand. 
• The dilution 
of the European market 
African agricultural exports t raditionally had 
Europe as their main market. reflecting their 
heavy dependence on the pathway resulting 
from the colonial period. More than half of all 
African agricultural exports still went to the Eu-
ropean Union in the early 2000s: but this pro-
portion has been steadily declining since then. 
falling to 37°/o in 2010 and to 34% in 2014. 
Africa is diversifying its trade partners. espe-
cially towards the emerging Asian countries. 
African agricultural exports to China and lndia, 
which were almost non-existent in 2000. have 
increased sharply in the last 15 years with an 
average growth rate of 17% and 13% respec-
tively. The Chinese market accounted for 3.9% 
of African agricultural exports in 2014. and the 
lndian market 3.6%. and their relative impor-
tance should continue to grow in the coming 
years. 
lntra-African trade in food products (cereals. 
tubers. animal products) should play an increa-
singly important role in exports. driven by po-
pulation growth and urban expansion in Africa. 
Once again. there is considerable potential 
here for agri-food processing. 
Vincent Ribier 
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M21. Land acquisitions and Chinese agricultural demonstration centres 
Source Landmatnx. Mofcom. Cffad 2015 
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THE PRESENCE OF CHINA IN AFRICA: 
A ROLE IN FUTURE AGRICULTURE 
Contrary to the much-publicized idea of 
a/1-out activism, especially in terms of land 
acquisitions, the presence of China in Africa is 
multifaceted and should be put into perspec-
tive. Agricultural investments remain limited 
and target on/y a sma/1 number of countries, 
but agriculture is graduai/y becoming a priority 
forChina-Africa cooperation. 
• A modest investor with 
a strong presence 
Among the emerging powers (Brazil and lndia. 
in particular) present in Africa. China holds 
a unique position in terms of cooperation 
policies. combining assistance programmes. 
direct investment. project development and 
rapid trade expansion. These m ultifaceted in-
terventions include not only those of large na -
t ional or provincial public enterprises. the Mi-
nistry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in particular. 
and the major banks (including EXIMbank and 
the China Africa Development Fund - CADF). 
but also those of small private entrepreneurs. 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FOI) re-
mains relatively low: it accounts for only 30/o 
of total Chinese FOI (70°/o of which is in Asia). 
although it is significant in some countries. 
The vast majority of this FOI is made in the 
construction and infrastructure sectors. vvith 
agriculture remaining marginal. But a diversi -
fication is being seen towards the agricultu-
ral sector, with equity participation in national 
companies. such as in the cocoa sector by 
China National Cereals. Oils and Foodstuffs 
Corp (COFCO) in Côte d'Ivoire. in t he rubber 
sector by Sinochem in Cameroon. or in the 
biofuels sector by Complant in several West 
African countries. 
However. although FOI amounts are small. 
the turnkey projects conducted and services 
provided by Chinese companies are growing 
in importance. especially for infrastructure 
(construction industry. hydro -agricultural 
schemes): their turnover far exceeds the 
volume of FOI in most countries. especially in 
Algeria. Angola. Ethiopia and Egypt. 
Land acquisitions by Chinese companies 
concern only a small number of countries and 
total just over 120 000 ha, which puts China 
very far behind the economic or institutional 
stakeholders from the OECD or Gulf countries. 
Most of these large-scale acquisitions are 
aimed at the production of rubber. cassava 
(for starch). sugarcane and. to a lesser extent. 
oil palms. For other agricultural products. 
contracts with local producers are preferred. 
These are aimed at domestic or regional mar-
kets for rice. vegetables and fish farming. but 
aise at the Chinese market. This is the case for 
wine growing in South Africa and especially for 
cotton: more and more Chinese companies 
are buying a large share of the production f rom 
West Africa and Mozambique. 
• A Key role in trade 
Trade between Africa and China increased 
substantially over the 2000-2014 period. To-
tal imports and exports stood at almost USD 
210 bill ion in 2014. a level that nevertheless 
remains far below the amount recorded for ail 
27 European Union countries (atjust over USD 
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360 bil lion). Since 2015. the slovvdown of the 
Chinese economy is impacting on African ex-
ports to China. especially for mining products. 
but these nevertheless account for almost 
a quarter of the total value of exports. While 
South Africa and Angola account for more 
than 70°/o ofChinese imports. exports towards 
Africa are for bet ter distributed. although 
South Africa and Nigeria constitute around 
40°/o of total trade flows. The structure of trade 
between China and Africa is very sim ilar to that 
of Europe or the United States: China mainly 
exports machines and manufactured consu-
mer goods. textiles. chemicals and metals: 
and it chiefly imports fuels and ores. The role 
of agriculture is smalt and accounts for only 2 
to 3% of total trade. The main Chinese exports 
are cotton and processed wood. tomatoes 
and green t ea (as well as tractors) Almost 50o/o 
ofthese products are sent to Benin. Togo and 
Nigeria. which act as "bridgeheads". Chinese 
imports mostly concern timber and raw cot-
ton. sesame. tobacco and wool. South Africa 
and Zim babwe supply almost a quarter of 
these flows. 
• A special role çor agriculture 
Despite the above indicators that provide 
perspective on China's position in Africa in ge-
neral. and in the agricultural sector in particular. 
agriculture "paradoxically" remains a priorityfor 
Chinese policy. This sector is placed "at the top 
of the agenda". as confirmed during the Forum 
on China-Africa Cooperation. which was held 
in Johannesburg in December 2015. 
The main instrument for China-Africa coope-
ration in the agricultural sector is the establish-
ment of agricultural demonstration centres. 
These centres. which are relatively small in size 
(100 ha at most). are aimed at agricultural ex-
perimentation (especially for improved irriga-
ted rice seed imported from China) and tech-
nology extension. They are currently being 
developed and provide different levels of sup-
port to the national and regional agricultural 
research centres. This policy is accompanied 
by investment in the agri-food sectors and the 
revival of food crop production. 
This support for the food production sector 
has a strategic goal. since it is aimed at pre-
venting any food crisis in Africa f rom impacting 
on international market prices for commo-
dities. especially rice. given that China is stil l 
dependent on the world market to meet it s 
domestic demand. This food security objec-
tive is a key component of China's policy and 
of its contribution to the security of the Africa n 
continent. The FOCAC has. for example. an-
nounced a USD 60 billion programme for the 
2016-2018 period aimed at "helping" Chinese 
companies to establish themselves in Africa. 
Although most of the specific projects are 
not yet known. this kind of boost will inevitably 
influence the dynamics of change in the agri-
cultural sector and rural areas. 
Jean-Jacques Gabas 
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M23. Share of mining in exports by country 
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MINING ACTIVITIES: 
NEW DYNAMICS AND RURAL IMPACTS 
The mining boom in Africa from 2000 to 2015 
has contributed to the economic growth of 
the continent. The exploitation of minerai re-
sources (ores, hydrocarbons} has two facets, 
divided between industrial activities that are 
a major source of revenue for states and an 
artisanal sector that is a massive provider of 
jobs. But questions are being asked about the 
effects of these activities on development, 
especially in rural areas. New regulations are 
not enough to correct their adverse impacts. 
lntegrating mining into territorial develop-
ment remains a challenge. 
• Mining booms and rural areas 
The current expansion of m ining is part of a 
long historical process. The image of Africa's 
economic extraversion. exports of m inerai raw 
mate rials follow boom and bust cycles that im-
pact on rural areas. Gold mining in West Africa 
and its international trade date back to ancient 
times. ln the Middle Ages. it laid the founda-
tions for the kingdoms of Ghana and Mali gold 
panning was a dry season activity conduc-
ted there to supplement farming. lndustrial 
m ining emerged in the late 19th century in 
South Africa and in the Copperbelt. where 
veritable mining regions (gold. copper. cobalt) 
and urban centres were established. requiring 
the organisation ofinterregional flows of food 
supplies. ln the 1950s-1960s, m ining invest-
ment increased substantially in response to 
global demand: hydrocarbons from the Gulf of 
Guinea and the Sahara. bauxite from Guinea. 
phosphates from Tunisia. Morocco. Senegal 
and Togo: iron f rom Mauritania and Liberia: ura-
nium from Niger and Namibia. and gold from 
Ghana. etc. 
After 20 years of lethargy. global growth driven 
by China has produced a new boom: the tra-
ditional mining basins are expanding and new 
ones are emerging (oil in Sudan. Chad. Niger. 
and Uganda: gold in Mali and Burkina Faso). 
Artisanal mining rushes are drawing in tens of 
thousands of miners (coltan and cassiterite in 
the Kivu region: sapphires in Madagascar: gold 
in Burkina Faso and Mali. and in Saharan Niger. 
Sudan and Chad). These rushes are explained 
by the price of m inerais and technology impro-
vements. which make mining more profitable. 
This phase is producing different rural configu-
rations: the nature of t he activit ies concerned 
determines their impacts and labour require-
ments: indu striai or artisanal: and whetherthey 
require major infrastructure (bulk commodi-
t ies such as iron) or not (high value. low weight 
m inerais: gold. diamonds). The characteristics 
of the areas in which projects are implemented 
are also important: whether or not they are 
densely populated, and whether or not they 
are in peripheral locations, etc. 
• The rural side 
to the "resource curse" 
Mining activities are emblematic of t he "re-
source curse". the idea that in states with weak 
institutions, resource exploitation is accom-
panied by macroeconomic and political fai-
lures. Although this notion should be qualified, 
the adverse impacts in question are manifold, 
especially in rural areas. Thus. "Dutch disease" 
refers to the tendency of a new mining sector 
to penalise existing productive activities such 
as agriculture. especially by drawing in the 
factors of production (labour. capital). Reve-
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nue from m ining also creates an "urban bias": 
a preference for investment in (urban) infras-
tructure and public services. and subsidies for 
food imports to the det riment of local farmers 
(Algeria. Nigeria). ln the territories concerned. 
industrial mines operate as enclaves with no 
spillover effects in the surrounding area. 
At the local level of rural societies. indus-
trial projects and gold panning have serious 
im pacts: the consumption of farmland and 
pastures: the destruction of landscapes (ex-
cavations. waste heaps): the diversion of agri-
cultural labour: inflation or even food crises 
that are accentuated by poor access to sites: 
health and environmental risks linked to the 
use of dangerous products (cyanide. mercury): 
educational wastage: a crisis of values: and 
tension between locals and migrants for jobs. 
which always fall far short of expectations in 
industrial m ines and are inaccessible to low-
skilled local workers. At the end of the cycle. 
the sudden cessation of activities means an 
inexorable slide into poverty for the towns 
concerned (Guinea. Zambia. DRC). highlighting 
their inherent dependence on these activities. 
• The challenges of territorial 
development in mining contexts 
However. mining activities also contribute to 
economic diversification and to the integration 
of rural t erritories. They distribute revenue: 
employment in this modern sector is limited. 
but salaries are relatively high; the artisanal 
sector is a major provider of jobs. but income 
is low and very unreliable. ln Burkina Faso. a 
recent producer of gold. eight indu striai mines 
provided 20 000 direct jobs in 2015. whereas 
artisanal gold panning employed 1 to 2 million 
people. Everywhere. the active phases of m i-
ning cycles boost the rural economy through 
numerous services (shops. banks. crafts. res-
taurants. bars. etc.) Local procurement by 
m ining companies. which is still lim ited. so-
metimes has structural effects - to the point 
of developing a gold m ining cluster in Accra. 
Ghana. Mining booms also help to integrate 
some peripheral regions into national territo-
ries through infrastructure, transport. flows of 
information and the dreams that go with them 
(western Mali, eastern Senegal: oil f rom Aga-
dem in Niger). 
ln the 2000s. the wave of regulations on mi-
ning revenue was extended to the local im-
pacts of these activities and to improving lin-
kages with the territories. Environmental and 
social impact studies. the "prior and informed 
consent" required for projects financed by the 
World Bank since 2011. and "local content" 
(obligations for foreign companies in terms 
of procurement. subcontracting and national 
employment) are just some of the tools used 
by NGOs and local people to improve the da-
mage/benefits balance. Compensation and 
resettlement mechanisms are gradually being 
improved. even if they have difficulty taking 
account of the evolution of impacts over time. 
Beyond the sporadic good will of one operator 
or another. the integration of mining activities 
into the public planning of territorial develop-
ment by t he state and local authorities is a 
major challenge. 
Géraud Magrin and 
Mouhamadou Lamine Diallo 
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M25. People's access to electricity in 2013 
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PHOTOVOLTAICS AND MOBILE TELEPHONY: 
DECENTRALISED TECHNOLOGIES SUITABLE 
FOR RURAL AREAS 
Africa - especially sub-Saharan Africa - is lag-
ging behind when it comes to connection to 
energy and telephone networks, but this cou/d 
be an advantage enabling it to direct/y adopt 
local, adaptable and innovative solutions. The 
continent cou/d thus become a vanguard in 
terms of future energy transitions and decen-
tralised services. Mobile telephony is breaking 
the isolation of rural communities and the 
development of solar energy will facilitate the 
diversification of local economies. 
• Electricity: major grey 
areas primarily concernin 
rural populations 
Africa is the continent with the lowest electrifi -
cation rates in the world and access to electri-
city is an obstacle to its development. But this 
observation characterises sub-Saharan Africa: 
while 99o/o of people in North Af rica had mains 
electricity in 2013, this rate stood at only 32°tt> 
(634 million people) in sub-Saharan Africa. ln 
eight countries, the rate of access to electri -
city stands at less than 10°/o. with particularly 
critical situations in South Sudan. the Central 
African Republic and Chad. However. in terms 
of the number of people without electricity. 
the greatest challenges are in Nigeria (96 mil-
lion). Ethiopia (71 million) and DRC (61 million). 
Current investments in power grids are not 
enough to counter the effect of population 
growth. ln recent years. the rate of connection 
has increased by only 2.3% per year compared 
to 2.7°/o for population growth. Grey areas still 
exist and the number of people without elec-
tricity is increasing. Whatever the country, it is 
always rural communities that have the lowest 
levels of access to electricity. ln sub-Saharan 
Africa. the rate of connection for rural popu-
lations stands at only 17%. compared to 59% 
for urban populations. 17 countries even have 
a rate of connection of less than 5% (South 
Sudan, the Central African Republic and Chad. 
as already mentioned. but also Sierra Leone 
and Burkina Faso) There is an energy divide 
between urban and rural areas in Af rica. 
• Africa, a future paragon 
of p~ otovoltaic energy? 
Rural demand for electricity is spatially dis-
persed and relatively low in terms of power. A 
rural African person consumes between 165 
and 600 kWh per year. compared to around 
1 420 kWh for urban dwellers and 6 000 kWh 
for Europeans. Consequently. catching up is 
a challenge while rural electrification through 
connection to the national grid remains com-
plex and costly due to the low population den-
sities still observed in many regions. 
However. there is an extensive. abundant 
energy resource in Africa: solar energy. Sun-
light is estimated at between 1 600 and 2 500 
kWh/m2. which is far more than for any other 
continent ln order to capitalise on this energy 
resource. photovoltaic systems (PVS) can now 
be used to produce electricity in even the most 
remote regions. and the potential for develop-
ment is huge. 
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Through the deployment of off-grid m icro-
systems and autonomous microgrids. solar 
energy can play a key role in rural electrifica-
tion. More and more experiments are being 
conducted with villages that are fully equipping 
themselves (Senegal. Mali) and the distribution 
of domestic photovoltaic kits (Uganda). South 
Africa and Morocco are the countries that have 
installed the largest number of PVS in recent 
years, with the implementation of proactive 
public policies (including the creation of solar 
power stations. as in southern Morocco) 
But between Morocco and South Africa there 
is a whole continent and a plethora of energy 
policies for which "good practice" on solar 
energy should be shared. Africa·s lag in terms 
of electrification in comparison with the other 
continents could even be a unique opportunity 
to adopta different model. one that is decen-
tralised and sustainable. thereby meeting the 
needs of millions of rural people while leading 
the way towards a possible energy transition. 
• Mobile telephony: 
connecting rural people in Africa 
Africa has become an Eldorado for mobile 
phones. While fixed line penetration is very low 
- at less than 10% on average - mobile phone 
services are booming. The total number of 
subscriptions to these services in 2014 was esti-
mated at 920 million. compared to 578 million in 
2010, 151 million in 2005 and 15 million in 2000. 
This spectacular growth is partially biased by 
competition between operators. which results 
in multiple individual subscriptions to optimise 
tariffs. 
There are. however. considerable differences 
between countries and a divide currently exists 
between the countries of North and Southern 
Africa. where the number of subscriptions 
exceeds the number of people, and the other 
countries of the continent. Sorne countries in 
West and Central Africa nevertheless also have 
subscription rates of more than 100%. East A fri-
c a is less well -connected. but is rapidly catching 
up. 
ln rural areas. the development of mobile tele-
phony is facilitating trade between producers 
and sellers on local markets. access to services 
(health, transport). the functioning of family 
networks and population mobility. lt is breaking 
the economic isolat ion of rural people, but it also 
has the potential to radically transform rural eco-
nomies with the development ofnew. innovative 
information and advisory services, in particular 
for agriculture (information on prices. rainfall or 
farming techniques), and especially of financial 
services. Mobile phone companies are joining 
forces with the banking system - or even deve-
loping their own financial services - to provide 
options for credit, payments and transfers, even 
in isolated areas with highly dispersed popula-
tions. ln this respect. Africa is a leader. and parti-
cularly the countries of East Africa. with the pro-
vision of services that have not yet taken off in 
many OECD countries. This catch up is accom-
panied by a leap forward in terms of innovation. 
Jacques lmbernon 
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TRENDS IN LARGE-SCALE LAND 
ACQUISITIONS IN AFRICA 
Africa has seen a significant increase in large-
scale land acquisitions (LSLA}. Although LS-
LAs have since slowed down and their impact 
on production remains limited, they provide 
evidence of long-term trends of growing com-
mercial interest in land. lnvestment by domes-
tic actors receives less media attention, but is 
growing in importance. 
• Africa - The main target 
for investo ·s 
Large-scale land acquisitions (LSLA) are the 
result of a global. ongoing phenomenon. which 
has accelerated since 2000. The multiplication 
of acquisitions has several converging roots. 
which. besides the long-term trends of popu-
lation growth and dietary changes. include: 
agricultural commodity price fluctuations. 
incentives to produce biofuels (crude oil prices 
and EU policies). and pre- and post-crisis new 
financial rationales to include land in the diver-
sification of asset portfolios. As such. not all 
investments are dedicated to food production. 
with a large num ber focusing on biofuel pro-
duction and other crops characterised by in-
creasing demand (such as rubber and cotton). 
Africa is by far the most targeted continent 
where deals for agricultural purposes are 
concerned. According to the Land Matrix. it 
accounts for 642 concluded LSLA deals ini-
tiated since the year 2000. covering an area o f 
nearly 23 923 007 hectares (equivalent to Ken-
ya's agricultural land area). The top 10 African 
target countries concentrate half of all listed 
land deals worldwide. 
This focus on Africa is st rongly related to the 
host countries' agricultural and pro-invest-
ment policies. Numerous African govern-
mentsconsiderthese large-scale investments 
as a way to diversify their sources of funding 
in a context of decreasing development aid. 
to generate new income. and to modernise 
their agricultural sector (in response to the 
loss of confidence in small- scale family-based 
structures and to the misreading of their real 
capacities). This focus on Africa also result s 
f rom the continent 's reputation. often seen as 
fertile and water- rich with large tracts of unde-
rutilised land. 
• Competition over land 
and conflicts 
The most targeted regions. often characte-
rised by high fertility and water access. are. 
however. also those vvith the most developed 
infrastructure and are often the areas most 
intensively used by local people. This obser-
vation therefore challenges the image of LS-
LAs as a development tool. lt also highlights 
land use competition and potential and actual 
conflict s over land. 
"Empty" lands are indeed rare in Africa. The 
diverse and complex local land tenure sys-
tems are often poorly understood and are not 
taken into consideration by national law. host 
governments and. subsequently. by exter-
nal investors. which may potentially lead to 
conflicting forms of appropriation. Reactions 
to LSLAs at the local and nat ional levels vary. 
f rom open conflict s with strong opposition in 
Senegal. Mozambique and more recently in 
Ethiopia. to "smooth" implementation pro-
cesses in Zambia and Malawi. 
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• Great expectations? Land 
ownership changes without 
rapid changes in land production 
lnvestors are (initially) seen by local communi-
ties and state representat ives as developers: in 
regions with few o r even no public services. ex-
pectations in terms of benefits are high and the 
numerous direct and indirect fînancial promises 
are welcomed. 
However, even though interest in land remains 
high and LSLAs are ongoing. very few deals 
are actually implemented. Of the 642 deals 
concluded. only 199 are operational. with just 
4% of the land cont racted actually cultivated 
(represent ing only 1 000 4 70 ha). 
ln addition. for those projects that are imple-
mented. info rmation regarding t he actual types 
of investment remains ext remely limited: little 
is known about the level of mechanisation. the 
number of jobs created or the development of 
outgrower schemes with local farmers. and this 
questions the real impacts of LSLAs on local 
development. 
• A number of large foreign 
stakeholders and an increase 
in domestic investors 
The Western countries are still the main inves-
tors in land in Africa: the UK is the leading inves-
tor in the cont inent in terms of the number of 
cases considered. The emerging economies are 
also very present. This is the case of the BRICS 
count ries (except for Russia). especially Bra-
zil. South Africa. and China (although the latter. 
cont raryto popular belief. is not the main player). 
other Asian countries (Singapore) and Middle 
Eastern countries -which are more active in the 
northern and eastern parts of the continent due 
to their geographic and cultural proximity. Whe-
reas the Western countries are expanding their 
markets and economic influence in the food 
and agricultural sector. Asian and Middle Eastern 
investors. from countries rich in capital but with 
limited natural resources. are aiming to secure 
their national food requirements. 
But LSLAs are not only a phenomenon led by 
foreign investors. The growing commercial inte-
rest in land has t riggered domest ic dynamics. 
with host country governments. local adminis-
t rations. ruling classes and local entrepreneurs 
act ing as partners. intermediaries and also 
stakeholders and direct benefîciaries. However. 
very little quantifiable data and information is 
available regarding the involvement of domes-
tic actors in the rush for land on the continent. 
This informat ion is necessary in order to reflect 
on the agricultural models to be promoted for 
sustainable and inclusive development in Africa. 
MONITORING LARGE-SCALE LANO 
ACQUISITION 
The data presented here is based on the Land Matrix. 
which may on/y reflect partial information; it is never-
theless a good basis to achieve a better understan-
ding of the phenomenon, to formulate hypotheses 
and to develop initial analyses. 
(see note page 69 ror details on the parameters of 
monitoring). 
Ward Anseeuw, Perrine Burnod, Jérémy 
Bourgoin, lkageng Maluleke, Saliou Niassy 
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WOOD: A KEY RESOURCE 
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
With population growth and urban develop-
ment, African demand for wood is growing 
steadily. Most of the countries of Africa are 
facing a major challenge: reconciling their 
economic development, which often implies 
deforestation, with the maintenance of tree 
canopy cover, which provides resources and 
basic services for rural and urban populations. 
• A resource that is still abundant 
but rapid deforestation in 
densely populated areas 
Trees - and forests - are key components of 
African territories and often provide essential 
resources for rural households. Trees are pre-
sent in almost ail plant format ions found on the 
continent. from the wooded savannas of the 
Sahel or the spiny forests of Madagascar to 
the dense rainforests of the Congo Basin. the 
mountain forests of Guinea and East Africa. 
and the dryforests (Miombo) of Southern and 
East Africa. Trees are also present in traditional 
cropping systems: in permanent fields in West 
Africa (tree parks), in complex agroforestry 
systems based on cacao and coffee trees in 
Central and East Af rica. and in ail shifting culti-
vation fallows. 
The second largest tropical forest area in the 
world after the Amazon is in Africa: the Congo 
Basin forests span more than 200 million 
ha. African forests and savannas represent 
around 1 billion ha. ln sub-Saharan Africa, they 
account for around 45% of the total land area. 
ln per capita ter ms. for est area stands at 1 ha/ 
person on average. compared to a global ave-
rage of 0 .8 ha/person. placing Africa ahead of 
Europe (excluding the Russian Federation) and 
Asia in terms of per capita forest resources. 
Deforestation is nevertheless affecting Afri-
ca. like all the other continents. From 2000 to 
2010. Africa lost 34 million ha of forest at a 
relatively stable annual rate of -0 .5°/o per year. 
This rate nevertheless varies considerably 
from one region to another and. contrary to 
popular belief. is higher in the dry regions of 
West and East Africa ( 1 o/o per year) than in the 
great forest basin of Central Af rica (0.2°/o per 
year). Thus. for the last 25 years. West Africa 
has been losing an average of 1 million ha of 
forest per year and East Africa 1.8 m illion ha. 
compared to 0.5 million ha in Central Africa. 
Deforestation is primarily due to agricultural 
expansion and to firewood gathering. which 
are more extensive in highly populated reg ions 
{the Rift Valley. the Soudano-Guinean zone) 
than in the "empty" parts of the Congo Basin. 
• Wood, a multi-purpose 
resource 
Wood has many uses in urban and rural areas. 
As bundles or charcoal. it is used to cook food: 
as logs. it is used to heat homes; and as planks. 
poles or beams, it is used to build houses and 
to make furniture. 
Energy remains by far the main use of wood. 
Wood is the principal source of energy for 
rural households throughout sub-Saharan 
Af rica and an important energy resource for 
isolated rural populations in North Africa. 750 
m illion Africans depend on wood for cooking 
and heating. or around 70% of the population 
of the continent. Fuelwood is also used by 
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rural tradespeople (bakers. blacksmiths) and 
byfarmers {smoking and drying food products. 
drying tea and tobacco). Average individual 
consumption is around 1.5 kg of wood/person/ 
day. This figure varies considerably from one 
country to another according to eating habits. 
household size and access to wood resources. 
Wood is also used to build rural and urban 
homes (frames. posts. joinery) and to make 
furniture (tables. chairs. beds). According to 
the country and the type of construction, each 
household uses an average ofbetween 0.5 m3 
and 6 m3 of wood for its home. 
• Dynamic wood sectors 
that provide jobs and income 
Logging and trade in t imber are key economic 
activities for the African countries and their po-
pulations. International trade in lumber. mainly 
towards China and lndia, is an important source 
of foreign currency for the countries of the Gulf 
of Guinea and of Central and East Africa (Came-
roon. CAR. Mozambique). But this formai t rade 
represents only a fraction of total tlows. More 
than 80% of ail t imber produced is sold on do-
mestic markets. 
Whether for energy or for construction, the 
production, processing and sale of timber are 
mainly conducted through local. informai chan-
nels involving millions of operators. African 
fuelwood production employs more than 13 mil-
lion people and the industrial and artisanal lum-
ber industry probably as many again. City supply 
chains are booming and new cross-border cir-
cuits are emerging from countries with abun-
dant resources (Cameroon. CAR. DRC) towards 
regions with more limited resources (North 
Africa. the Sahel countries). These informai 
sectors appear only rarely in national accounts. 
but they generate turnovers estimated in billions 
of US dollars. 
• A major challenge: 
reconciling tree canopy cover 
al'ld economic development 
With population growth. urban development. 
the emergence of a middle class demanding 
capital goods and the lack of alternative domes-
tic energies. wood requirements are steadily 
increasing. A major challenge for most African 
countries is to ensure their economic develop-
ment while preserving the essential ecosystem 
services provided by wooded areas to popula-
tions. 
The response to this challenge requires public 
policies that. on the one hand. recognise infor-
mai lumber and fuelwood sectors as opportu-
nities for local development that should be pro-
fessionalised, monitored and more effectively 
supported and. on the other hand, integrate 
the preservation of ecologically functional and 
economically productive tree canopy cover into 
t erritorial planning policies. 
Laurent Gazull 
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BLUE GOLD AND ITS CHALLENGES: 
WATER STRESS IN AFRICA 
There are many challenges related to water 
in Africa: providing safe drinking water for al/; 
deve/oping food production without depleting 
water resources; and implementing water-
and energy-saving irrigation techniques, 
among others. These challenges can on/y 
be met by mobilising human, financial and 
technica/ resources in order to make the 
necessary investments and to maintain them 
overtime. 
• Uneven distribution 
of water resources 
Africa has many different types of cl imate 
and a wide range of population densities. This 
results in major differences in total per capita 
water availability. Another important parame-
ter is the dependency ratio. which expresses 
the percentage of renewable water resources 
o riginating outside the count ry: this ratio is 
high on average (60% or more) and peaks 
("' 80°/o) in countries such as the Republic of 
the Congo. Botswana and Namibia; but the 
most spectacular ratios are seen in Egypt and 
Sudan. where they reach nearly 100°Ai. highli-
ghting the fact that these countries are almost 
entirely dependent on water f rom large rivers 
entering from upstream countries. 
Surface water is not available everywhere all 
year round. Outside the equatorial zone. most 
watercourses are seasonal and dams are nee-
ded to regulate them. Water cornes primarily 
f rom large rivers and only the land immediately 
adjacent to these rivers can be easily irrigated. 
Making better use of water in order to irrigate 
more land implies large water infrastructure 
projects and the major constraints inherent in 
the management of vast irrigated areas. 
• Water consumption marked 
by agricultural uses 
Arid and semi-arid countries consume a signi-
ncant proportion of their renewable water 
resources. Egypt and Libya epitomise this. 
consuming respectively all and six times more 
than their available water. which is only possible 
in Libya through massive pumping of non-
renewable groundwater. Most of the water 
consumed is used for irrigation. Water distri-
but ion between household. indust rial and agri-
cultural uses differs greatly in humid regions. 
which have very lit t le irrigated agriculture. 
The North African countries alone consume 
half of ail water used on the continent. If we 
include Nigeria. South Africa. Sudan and Mada-
gascar. we see t hat just nine of the 53 African 
countries account for a total of 80o/o of ail water 
consumed on the continent. 
Many of the countries that have developed 
irrigation are also those that have to import 
water on a massive scale in order to meet their 
dietary needs. This dependence drives them 
to further extend and intensify their irrigated 
agriculture. at the risk of creating water crises. 
To t ap into new water resources. they resort 
to pumping from aquifers. but at a rate signin-
cantly higher than their recharge rate (almost 
zero in the Sahara) This produces energy 
requirements and lowers the water table, 
thereby threatening the future of these 
aquifers. ln order to protect water resources. 
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water- saving irrigation techniques are being 
developed. such as drip irrigation in North 
Africa. which maybe subsidised. 
• Potential conflicts 
Sorne countries are major agricultural water 
users and depend on other upstream countries. 
There is already tension over water use and new 
disagreements could emerge in response to 
economic dynamics and policy choices. but also 
and perhaps especially as a result of ongoing 
climate change that could reduce water availabi-
lity and increase evaporat ion. depending on the 
country. 
This tension is supposed to be managed by 
international treaties and river basin organisa-
tions such as the Nile Basin Initiative. But in 2013. 
the construction of the Renaissance Dam in 
Ethiopia led to Egypt's withdrawal from the basin 
organisation and the escalation of tensions. 
An Egypt-Sudan-Ethiopia agreement signed 
in 2015 helped to relieve pressure. but there is 
still a latent divide between water "supplier" and 
"consumer" countries. 
The conjunction of a resource shared by several 
countries and a high level of resource use in one 
of these countries is a major risk factor for the 
emergence of water conflicts: in addition to the 
Nile. this situation could also occur for the Sene-
gal. Niger and Limpopo rivers and their riparian 
countries. 
• Poor access to safe water 
in rural areas 
According to the World Health Organization. 
the minimum water requirement to meet basic 
human needs (drinking. cooking and perso-
na) hygiene) is 25 litres per capita per day. But 
higher quantities (50 1/capita/day) are needed 
to also cover the other basic needs (laundry and 
household hygiene). However, more than half of 
African countries consume on average less than 
50 1/capita/day for domestic uses. and a quarter 
consume less than 251. 
Access to safe drinking water for African people 
is equally alarming: in many countries. 40°/o of 
the population has a round-trip of more than 30 
minutes to the nearest source of drinking water 
(the UNICEF reference standard). The situation 
is even worse in the countryside. where up to 
80% of people have no access to safe water. 
Paradoxically. the countries with the largest 
water resources are among those with the 
lowest levels of drinking water coverage. espe-
cially in rural areas. Conversely. the North African 
countries and some Southern African countries. 
where far less water is available, have almost 
100% drinking water coverage. Large water re-
sources do not therefore necessarily imply that 
people actually have access to these resources. 
To provide rural populations with access to drin-
king water. investment is needed in infrastruc-
ture and organisations. and effective. sustai-
nable governance is required. More generally. 
better water resource management implies 
major investments in order to both improve 
water supply and to manage demand. At river 
basin level. many countries are making conside-
rable efforts to set up basin agencies and. more 
locally. user associat ions with the goal of achie-
ving decentralised water governance. Water 
management at the most appropriate local 
level should guarantee greater efficiency. equity 
and local stakeholder involvement in decision-
making .. 
Stefano Farolfi, Jean-Yves Jamin 
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WHICH REGULATIONS FOR LAND-USE 
CONFLICTS IN RURAL PARTS 
OF THE CONGO BASIN? 
The dense forests of the Congo Basin are stilf 
relative/y unaffected by human activities. 
However, the socio-economic emergence 
strategies of the countries of the region are 
likely to radicalfy change this situation by 
increasing land-use conflicts. Forestry and 
protected areas have to some extent been in 
conflict in the past, yet new sources of tension 
are emerging with the expansion of mining 
and agro-industry. These different uses of 
resources wi/1 require intersectoral land-use 
planning. 
• A rural setting 
that is often marginalised 
The dense rainforests of Central Africa are the 
world 's second largest forest area. With the 
exception of some very active corridors. the 
main deforestation fronts are still situated at 
the periphery of the forest block. ln its western 
half, people are largely concentrated in towns 
and along roads. and vast tracts of forest re-
main very sparsely populated (Gabon. Congo, 
south-eastern Cameroon). However. in the 
DRC. the socio-economic and security situa-
tion has resulted in rural populations moving 
further afield. even into the forests. and a large 
part of Cameroon and the Albertine Rift are 
now seriously impacted by human activit ies. 
ln a general context marked by the fragility 
of economic development and by insecurity. 
rural people rely essentially on slash and burn 
agriculture and hunting for their livelihoods. 
Fuelwood gathering (firewood and charcoal) 
accounts for more than 80o/o of all wood har-
vested. Consequently. deforestation and 
more generally the degradation of natural 
resources remain limited. This situation could 
radically change in the coming years with the 
proliferation of industrial logging. agriculture 
and mining projects. 
• The "anarchie" exploitation 
of natural resources 
For several decades. industrial logging for tim-
ber - historically the only industry present in 
rural parts of the Congo Basin - has produced 
little deforestation but more significant forest 
degradation. especially due to the opening of 
forest tracks encouraging agricultural deve-
lopment. ln the virtual absence of state inter-
vention. this logging industry has supported 
some rural socio -economic development and 
the emergence of small rural communities. 
Although few other industries exploit natural 
resources due to the geopolitical situation and 
the lack of infrastructure. mining and agricul-
tural plantation projects are likely to disrupt the 
environmental. social and econom ic condi-
tions of these rural areas. lndeed. these new 
activities are land-intensive and can dramati-
cally alter the local socio -economic environ-
ment Allocation and land-use conAicts are 
already growing. 
Over the last 20 years. logging has become 
far more extensive in the region. sometimes 
resulting in land-use conflicts w ith pre-exis-
ting or newly created protected areas. due 
to a lack of consultation between the various 
government departments. and with the rural 
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communit ies. Sorne of these conAicts are 
currently being resolved thanks to a dialogue 
between the stakeholders concerned. with 
the support of donors involved in programmes 
encouraging sustainable logging and forest 
certification. the strengthening of protec-
ted area networks and community-based 
natural resource management. However. new 
sources of conflict are emerging. especially 
with the m ining sector. for which exploration 
and mining permits are awarded without any 
real consultation with the other sectors. 
• The need for integrated 
development policies 
for rural areas 
Despite some past attempts at land-use plan-
ning in southern Cameroon and in several pro-
vinces of the DRC. no sustainable land-use po-
licy has yet been implemented in Central Africa. 
whether at the national or regional level. Only 
Gabon seems to be working in this direction. 
However. the REDD+* strategies that the states 
wish to apply and. more broadly. the goal of plan-
ning sustainable development that takes into 
account territorial inequalities and rural poverty. 
require intersectoral planning of land-allocation 
and land-use changes. 
With the expansion of the agro- industrial and 
mining sectors. land uses are in danger of over-
lapping in rural areas. requiring the establish-
ment of clear management rules between 
the different users. and the implementation of 
land-use policies. The Commission of Cen-
tral African Forests (COMIFAC), which brings 
together the ministers responsible for forests 
from all over Central Africa. is conducting 
regional discussions on natural resources. lt 
could act as a catalyst for the intersectoral 
planning of land-use in the Congo Basin. 
OBSERVATOIRE DES FORÊTS D'AFRIQUE 
CENTRALE (OFAC - CENTRAL 
AFRICAN FOREST OBSERVATORY) 
Under the umbrella of COMIFAC. and with the sup-
port of German cooperation and the European 
Union. OFAC is creating a regional atlas on land-use 
in 10 Central African countries in order to support 
them in the design of their integrated land-use stra-
tegies. This interactive atlas is already helping to iden-
tify overlapping land uses. which are often sources of 
potential conflicts. The provision of this atlas to the 
sectoral administrations and information updates by 
these administrations provide the different stakehol-
ders with a shared. up-to-date reference on land-use. 
which fosters the transparency of information and a 
common vision of territorial development 
http:#www.observatoire-cornifàc.net 
Charles Ooumenge, Quentin Jungers, 
Claire Halleux, Lyna Bélanger, Paul Scholte 
• REDD /Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation/ is an initiative launched in 2008 and coordinated by 
the UN. lts aim is to mitigate global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions produced by the degradation. destruction 
and fragment.ation of forests. The addition of«+» illustrates the inclusion of the increase in carbon stocks. through appropria te 
silvicultural praclices or plantations. for example. lts principle is to compensa te developing and emerging counlries by means 
of contributions from industrialised countries. either through a market or a fund. 
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52 M39. Dynamics of agricultural areas in the Senegal River delta 
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THE AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL 
FOR THE SENEGAL RIVER DELTA 
For more than 50 years, the Senegal River delta 
and Lake Guiers area has seen constant growth 
in hydro-agricultural developments. Today, 
the goals of food sovereignty and economic 
growth assigned to the agricultural sector 
by the government are being put forward to 
justify the arrivai of agro-industrial inves-
tors, raising questions about the future of the 
region. 
• Agricultural intensification 
based on water management 
The Senegal River valley is one of the main 
agricultural regions in Senegal. with irrigation 
potential of almost 240 000 ha. Within this 
area. the delta and Lake Guiers zone (with it s 
agricultural potential of 115 200 ha) is charac-
terised by a number of challenges concerning 
the use of land and water resources by agri-
culture (whether irrigated, flood recession or 
rainfed). pastoralism. fishing. tourism and the 
general population (water supply to part of 
the capital city. Dakar). The marked intensifi-
cation of agricultural activities observed today 
is being questioned from the perspective of 
its impacts in terms of land use and practice 
changes. 
Efforts to intensify agricultural production be-
gan when the country gained independence 
in 19 60 with the creation of major wat er sche-
mes, mainly focusing on rice production, and 
based on the fi rst projects of the 19 50s near 
Richard Toll. ln 1965. the SAED (Société d:t\mé-
nagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Del-
ta du Fleuve Sénégal et des Vallées du Fleuve 
Sénégal et de la Falémé - Senegal River Delta 
Development and Exploitation Company) was 
tasked with developing the management and 
maintenance of water schemes and water 
supplies. as well as with land management in 
these pioneer zones. Almost 25 000 ha ofirri -
gated land had thus been developed by 1978: 
13 500 ha of public schemes and 11 500 ha of 
foreign private agro-industrial schemes. 
From 1979. under the impact of the structural 
adjustment plans. the withdrawal of the state 
led to a reduction in SAED assignments in 
farm advisory services and the management 
of structural schemes. Local producers. o rga-
nised in unions, were tasked with developing 
their farms and managing water use. The de-
velopment of private schemes was facilitated 
by simplified access to land managed by the 
rural communities created in 1980 (further to 
the decentralisation bill of 19 7 2). Consequent-
ly. between 1979 and 2000. almost 29 000 ha 
of private hydro-agricultural schemes were 
added. 
The government continued to support the 
modernisation of family farming and private 
entrepreneurship until the m id- 2000s. Howe-
ver. the food price crisis of 2008 resulted in a 
shift in agricultural policy. which now focused 
on the supposed spil lover effects of agro-in-
dustries. Thanks to various incentive mecha-
nisms. around 25 500 ha of land were thus 
irrigated between 2000 and 2015. almost 
11 000 ha of which were developed by foreign 
ag ro- industries. 
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• Agro-industry and family 
farming: competition 
or synergies? 
ln the 1980s. the development of private irri-
gated land was facilitated by improvements in 
water regulation (thanks to the construction of 
the anti-salt dam at Diama near the mouth of 
the river in 1986 and the Manantali dam further 
upstream in Mali in 1989), by the decentrali-
sation of land management. and by access to 
credit with the creation of the Caisse Natio-
nale de Crédit Agricole du Sénégal bank (1985). 
Today. t he extension of private irrigated land is 
continuing with the growing presence of agro-
industries that are investing in water schemes 
(from 2.5 to 4 m illion FCFA/ha depending on the 
irrigation method chosen). Projects are being 
developed in areas previously reserved for lives-
tock farming and are backed by the political will 
to promote agribusiness. the modernisation 
of family farming and the agri-food sector. To 
support this agricultural mode!. land and decen-
t ralisat ion reforms are aimed at improving land 
tenure security for investors. The World Bank is 
accompanying this change through the Senegal 
Sustainable and Inclusive Agribusiness Deve-
lopment Project (PDIDAS). the goal of which is 
to promote growth and employment in this part 
of the river with an increase in private produc-
t ive investment. ln 2015. the project had already 
pre-identified more than 18 000 ha of land that 
could be suitable for future investors or for the 
expansion of agro-industries already present. 
ln this context. many questions are being asked 
about the social and economic impacts of this 
agro-industrial development. especially regar-
ding the role of pastoral activities. the conditions 
for access to land for family farmers and the 
consequences of newinvestments on their pro-
duction and yields. More generally. the nature of 
interactions between family farmers and agro-
industries is at stake. Will agro-industry have 
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spillover effects on t he delta area. improving 
the living conditions of local people? What will 
the future be like for pastoral areas where land-
use conflicts are already a source of tension? 
ln spite of the existence of regulatory zoning. 
these areas are shrinking under the effect of the 
expansion of irrigated agriculture and of agri-bu-
siness contract farming. The areas allocated to 
agro-industries are now forcing pastoralists to 
find new. less diverse rangelands, thereby adding 
to friction with family farmers. 
This mode! of agricultural intensification and 
opening up to agro-industrial investments is po-
tentially divisive given the high rural densities. the 
size of the agricultural population and the large 
number of young workers looking for places 
to settle. Although the choice of the neoliberal 
development model is supported at the politi-
cal level, local actors supported by civil society 
are questioning its social and environmental 
impacts in areas that were previously reserved 
for pastoral and agro-pastoral practices. 
The future of the delta will depend on the capa-
city of actors to anticipate and develop change 
scenarios. to organise the coexistence of the 
different types of activities. and to find synergies 
beti,veen them in order to ensure sustainable 
territorial development for a rapidly growing 
population. 
Jérémy Bourgoin, Elodie Valette, 
Djibril Diop, Amandine Adamczewski, 
Djiby Dia, Labaly Touré 
53 
54 
M40. Flooded areas of Lake Chad between 1973 and 2013 
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LAKE CHAD: 
A MULTITUDE OF CHALLENGES 
ln 2016, Lake Chad is in the eye of the storm of 
Boko Haram terrorist attacks. These attacks 
are obscuring the threat of its possible disap-
pearance, which has - wrongly so far - been 
the main focus of concerns about the lake for 
many years. This unique /ake, which straddles 
four countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and 
Nigeria), is emblematic of the potentia/ for 
territorial development based on wetland 
agriculture. An African rural sustainab/e 
development mode/ cou/d emerge on its 
shores. 
• From the myth of 
disappearance to unrecognised 
prosperity 
The droughts of the 1970s and 1980s rei-
gnited fears about the disappearance of Lake 
Chad. The idea that the surface area of the 
lake has decreased from 25 000 km2 in 1969 to 
2 000 km2 today due to human water use and 
climate change took up the greater part of the 
development agenda until recently. However, 
for the last 25 years. this idea has been at odds 
with the realities of the lake. which has made it 
difficult to design and implement public poli-
c1es. 
Lake Chad has a high natural variability: it is very 
shallow (three meters at most) and subject to 
high evaporation: its surface area reflects rain-
fall in its basin. The sources of its two main tri-
butaries, the Chari and Logone rivers (85% of 
inflow). are located in the Sudanian zone. High 
rainfall in the 1950s and 1960s produced a 
Medium Lake Chad. w ith a single body of water 
covering 25000km2• Sincethe droughtin 1973 
it has been known as Small Lake Chad. with two 
basins (southern and northern) separated by 
a shoal and surrounded by marshlands. If the 
inflow from the Chari that feeds the southern 
basin is insufficient. the northern basin re-
mains dry. This is then known as the Dry Small 
Lake Chad. a situation observed several times 
between 1973 and 1991. but not since then. 
Since 1991. the average flooded area is 10 000 
km2 (+/- 4 000). The past failure oflarge-scale 
irrigation projects in the basin explains the low 
level ofhuman water use: 2-3 km3 for 18-20 
km3 average inflow. 
The Small Lake nevertheless displays great 
economic dynamism. lts natural resources 
(fish. water. land and floodplain grazing mar-
shes) have attracted many m igrants from 
different origins who have been affected by 
drought. The lakeside communities (2 million 
people in 2014) have adapted to the variabi-
lity of the environment through mobility (to 
follow resources). multi-activity (associating 
farm ing. fishing and livestock rearing. depen-
ding on the water level. ethnie specialities and 
resources available) and multifunctionality (the 
same area of land may sometimes be used 
for three different activities over the course 
of a year). Successive endogenous innova-
tions have resulted in a substantial increase in 
agricultural productivity. These family farming 
systems create value-added (per worker and 
at the territorial level) and far more jobs than 
those provided by modern farms speciali-
sing in cereals in Africa. Through regular food 
experts (cereals. vegetables. fish and cattle). 
they contribute to food security in a hinterland 
with 13 million people polarised by N'Djamena 
and Maiduguri. 
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• lnsecurities 
This situation does not preclude vulnerabi-
lity. which concerns water first of all. Although 
there is no doubt about global warming. the 
IPCC models do not yet give any reliable fore-
cast of rainfall changes in this part of Africa. 
What is certain is that the population of the 
Chad Basin is going to increase substantially: 
from 51 million people in 2016 to 130 million 
in 2050. If per capita water use doubles to 
meet new food and urban requirements. water 
withdrawals upstream will reach nearly 10 km3 
annually. However. if inflow to the lake is less 
tha n 15 km3 • the northern basin will not be fed. 
Since the 2000s. the revival of irrigation in the 
basin, both public and private. has demonstra-
ted the dangers of inefficient. uncoordinated 
water resource management. The project for 
water transfer from the Ubangi River to Lake 
Chad. which was first conceived in the late 
1980s and adopted by the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission (LCBC) in 2014. makes sense 
in the face of these long-term prospects. lt 
nevertheless raises a number of questions 
(impacts. financial viability. geopolitics) that 
make its implementation improbable. 
The main threat currently facing Lake Chad is 
violence. The Boko Haram insurgency began in 
2009 in Maiduguri. Nigeria. due to local political 
causes. lt then gradually spread through rural 
parts of the Borno region and Lake Chad in 
2013-2014. Villages have been razed. and tens 
of thousands of people have fled to the lake's 
shores in neighbouring countries. The crisis 
highlights and exacerbates tension linked to 
poverty in the Lake Chad Basin, which has one 
of the highest population growth rates in the 
world. ln Lake Chad, growing tension over land 
had become difficult to manage in a context 
of decentralisation conducive to partisan 
manipulation. The large numbers of young 
islanders joining Boko Haram has been 
interpreted as an attempt to repel the 
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migrants who were threatening their access 
to resources. The Lake Chad "oasis" is in 
danger. 
• A laboratory 
for territorial development? 
But the worst-case scenario may never happen. 
and Lake Chad could also serve as a framework 
for new territorial development policies. The 
Lake Chad Development and Climate Resi-
lience Act ion Plan presented in December 2015 
by the LCBC at COP21 in Paris. with the support 
of the World Bank. establishes some possible 
guidelines for this framework. The challenge is 
to reconcile respect for environmental balances 
and contributions to food security and employ-
ment. lncreasing resilience in the immediate 
term implies ensuring development: providing 
public goods (roads, water. education. electri-
city) and supporting productive sectors. but also 
increasing the security of land rights. based on 
principles of inclusive democratic citizenship. 
The goal would thus be to art.iculate support 
for agriculture and for spatial management (by 
increasing the resilience of family farms to envi-
ronmental variability). regional integration (based 
on the management of trade and shared water 
resources) and territorial development (through 
the equipment of secondary poles helping to 
create jobs and value based on rural produc-
tion, while balancing the urban network). Lake 
Chad provides the resources - both natural and 
human - for an innovative development model. 
Meeting the political and institutional conditions 
for its implementation remains a challenge. 
Géraud Magrin 
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THE ILLUSION OF ABUNDANCE: 
AGRICULTURAL LAND ISSUES 
IN THE VAKINANKARATRA REGION 
IN MADAGASCAR 
High population growth is putting additional 
pressure on agricultural land and exacerba-
ting the challenge of access to land for many 
people. Beyond the technical successes of 
decentralised land management, territorial 
approaches need to be consolidated in order 
to enable the implementation of assessments 
and concerted action plans. 
• The paradox: smaller farms 
and an abundance of land 
ln Madagascar. of the 40 m illion ha (Mha) of 
agricultural land. only 3.5 Mha are cultivated 
and 10 Mha are cultivable. Despite this poten-
tial. average farm sizes. which are already very 
small. are getting smaller. By extending the 
trends observed in the last two agricultural 
censuses (1984 and 2004). the average size of 
farms could be halved over the next 40 years. 
falling from 1.2 ha in 1984 to 0.61 ha in 2024. 
The extension of agricultural land should help 
to remove land constraints on family far ms. but 
to understand the real room for manoeuvre. it 
is necessary to move up to the regional level in 
order to conduct a detailed territorial assess-
ment and to implement a forward-looking 
exercise more consistent vvith local realities 
and perceptions. 
The Vakinanka ratra reg ion. one of the most po-
pulated and economically dynamic parts of the 
large island. provides a better understanding 
of the gap between the land potential an-
nounced and the areas actually cultivated. ln 
this region. as at the national level. agricultu-
ral population growth is high and is following 
the same pattern as demographic growth. 
The secondary and tertiary sectors. driven 
by the beginning of industrial development in 
the regional capital Antsirabe. are incapable 
of significantly absorbing the workforce from 
the younger generations. The majority of the 
population (86°/o of the labour force in 2012) 
still depend on agriculture for their livelihood. 
including people in urban areas. Consequently. 
even with a reduction in population growth. the 
number of farms would continue to grow and is 
expected to almost triple in the next 40 years. 
• More and more farms, but little 
growth in cultivated areas 
The very low growth rate for cultivated areas 
(0 9% per year over the 1984- 2004 period at 
the national level) raises questions about the 
reality of access to land. Potential reserves of 
land are far away from where people currently 
live and situated in harsh environments: supply 
and demand for land rarely coincide. The wes-
tern part of the region (the Betafo and Mando-
to districts). which was the agricultural frontier 
in the 1970s. no longer seems to playthis role. 
lnfra- regional disparities in terms of popula-
tion distribution. but also of infrastructure. ser-
vices and quality of life. are very high: they are 
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the result of long-standing conflicts between 
precolonial kingdoms and then of colonial ru le. 
but also of the prevalence of malaria and inse-
curity: and they are growing as time goes by. 
ln 1993. population densities by district ran-
ged from fewer than 20 people/km2 to more 
than 100. If effective changes are not made. 
especially in terms of migration. this gap could 
widen by 2024. ln the most populated areas. 
it is impossible to access new land through 
clearing because of a situation of saturation. 
serving as a reminder that uncultivated land is 
rarelyfree from rights and usage. 
However. in order to absorb agricultural popu-
lation growth by 2024 without reducing cur-
rent average farm size. the cultivated area at 
the regional lever needs to be increased by 
95 000 ha. Without any readjustment. it should 
thus cover almost a third of the territory in 
the most densely populated districts (>200 
people/km2)! 
Since the 1980s. farms have been compen-
sating for the reduction in their land. livestock 
and equipment by the intensification of labour 
(disappearance of fallows. double cropping. 
and optim isation of organic fertilisers). Des-
pite this. the growing disparities between the 
prices of manufactured goods and those of 
agricultural goods. combined with political 
crises and climate shocks. are keeping most 
rural families in poverty. ln these conditions. it 
is difficult for households to purchase and/or 
improve land of lower agricultural quality or to 
establish a new farm in a remote location. 
• The challenge of access to land: 
the need for a global vision 
Between 2005 and 2015. the land reform was 
based on increasing land security through the 
legal recognition of customary rights to cultiva-
ted land and the granting of new competences 
to local municipalities. ln the Vakinankaratra 
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region. this commitment to decentralising land 
management has been partially successful: 83 
out of 91 municipalities now have a local land 
office and most are still active despite the na-
tional crisis situation between 2009 and 2014. 
But the challenge of access to land. the focus 
of land policy for the next 15 years. remains 
unresolved. Since 2015. the region has been 
attempting to attract entrepreneurs by pro-
viding them with "secure" land within the f ra-
mework of agricultural investments zones. But 
most ofthis land is proving to be already occu-
pied by farmers. Knovvledge about the areas 
available and about current rights and usage is 
still lacking. Facilitating access to land requires 
a thorough consultation process resul ting in 
an agreement with rights holders at the local 
lever. 
Migration movements towards the least popu-
lated territories appear very lim ited because of 
strong socioeconomic t ies with the territory of 
origin. the desire for access to m inim al public 
services and fears about insecurity for goods 
and people. ln order to stimulate readjust-
ments that can boost development. policies 
must therefore focus on developing infras-
tructure and public services and investing in 
farms to facil itate their installation in territories 
where land is available. but of lower agricultural 
value. These policies should be driven by a glo-
bal vision of territorial development. based on 
a reliable assessment of current realities and 
existing potential. 
Jean- François Bélières, Perrine Burnod, 
Patrick Rasolofo, Jean-Michel Sourisseau 
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TERRITORIAL PLANNING TO MEET 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGE 
IN SÉGOU (MALI) 
ln Ségou, as in most parts of Mali, agriculture 
is still the main source of tivetihood for house-
holds. There is considerable potential for 
developing irrigation and the agri-food 
sector in the region, but economic diversifi-
cation remains a challenge in terms of mee-
ting the demand for jobs, both now and in the 
coming decades. The development of strate-
gies at the regional level provides an oppor-
tunity for mobilising synergies between stake-
holders and between sectors. 
• A long-standing 
specialisation in the primary 
and informai sectors 
The city of Ségou. the capital of the kingdom 
with the same name during the pre-colonial 
period. is a commercial crossroads and politi -
cal centre. and has preserved its administra-
tive tradition. Today. it is nevertheless agricul-
ture that best characterises the reg ion and its 
diversity, with in the south. rainfed production 
systems based on millet and sorghum. some-
times including cotton: in the central zone. 
between the Bani and Niger rivers. the exten-
sive cult ivation of millet: and in the north. the 
Sahel, which is dominated by extensive sys-
tems and small ruminant breeding. This spe-
cialisation has been reinforced by the emble-
matic water project initiated in the 1930s by 
the Office du Niger (ON). which has enabled 
the irrigation of plains north of the river cove-
ring more than 110 000 ha (with a potential 
of around 1 m illion ha) and the development 
of rice cultivation and vegetable growing. The 
ON. and to a lesser extent the area of the 
Office Riz Ségou. are key components of the 
country's food security strategy that focus 
political attention and give substance to the 
region's articulation with the national level. 
Despite ambitions of economic diversification 
through the development of the agri-food 
industry and the tertiary sector. considered 
as a source of long-term growth. this primary 
specialisation has not diminished over the last 
few decades. lt has even resulted in a decline 
in the secondary sector since the late 1980s. 
The tertiary sector is gaining ground. but the 
jobs concerned are mostly and almost struc-
turally informai. 
• Challenges linked to the 
expected doubling 
of the population 
The population of the Ségou region increased 
by a factor of 31 between 1960 and 2015, in 
other words 2.7 million more people (3.3 m il-
lion for the whole of Mali). This growth has so 
far resulted in the extension of agricultural 
land and rural densification: although urbani-
sation is progressing. it is not concentrated 
in the three main cities of Ségou. Niono and 
San. lnstead. we are seeing the spread of small 
towns and villages. especially with new districts 
and hamlets. which add to the network of se-
condary towns. This densification is occurring 
along three lines: along the Bamako-Mopti 
road (and beyond to Gao): along the Niger 
River with the municipalities of Baroueli. Bla 
and San; and, more recently, along the Ségou-
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Niono road. These three routes for the move-
ment of goods and people (especially with 
internai flows of seasonal agricultural workers) 
link the medium-sized regional towns. carry 
agricultural production towards Bamako and 
govern mobility towards Côte d'Ivoire and Bur-
kina Faso. 
The population is expected to more than 
double by 2050. reaching 6.5 million people. 
with extreme densification in populated areas. 
This outlook will mean very high demand for 
jobs or income-generating activities. Assu-
ming a constant employment rate of 70% 
(measured in 2012). 65 000 young people will 
need to find jobs every year by 2035. compa-
red to only 38 000 in 2015. Cumulatively. this 
growth in demand represents around one mil-
lion jobs to be generated between 2015 and 
2035. 
ln 2035. a large part of activity will still be agri-
cultural. Without any major technical changes. 
this growth will correspond to additional agri-
cultural land requirements of 1. 1 million ha 
by 2035 (compare to 1.4 million cultivated 
today). The plains provide significant poten-
tial for new land development. but the pace of 
extensions planned by the ON and the other 
irrigated areas needs to be tripled or quadru-
pled to ensure effective adaptation. Moreover. 
population densification will result in increased 
pressure on resources and more and more 
land-use conflicts between pastoralists. far-
m ers and agro-pastoralists, in a context of 
insecurity caused by the j ihadist threat in the 
northern and central parts of the country. 
• The need for 
territorial strategies 
Comparing past dynamics with the challenges 
of the next 20years calls for the implementation 
of effective strategies for action. This implies 
creating income-generating, labour-intensive 
activities. while planning territorial development 
that takes into account pressure on natural re-
sources. 
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Renewed attention needs to be given to agri-
culture, especially with a shift towards produc-
t ion systems that are better suited to resource 
management. require less costly inputs. pro-
vide jobs, and promote and develop the skills of 
local farmers. This means providing support for 
family farms and their development. especially 
in the irrigated areas. and exploring agro-eco-
logical solutions. But strictly sectoral policies are 
not enough. Job creation should also involve 
amplifying current dynamics and intersectoral 
synergies. both upstream and downstream of 
agriculture (especially the potential for product 
processing). and anticipating ways to meet the 
needs of the people. 
One prerequisite is therefore investment in 
healthcare and education. combined with popu-
lation and mobility policies suited to the regional 
context. lnvestment must also be made in eco-
nomic infrastructure capable of init iating rapid, 
inclusive diversification. based on the develop-
ment of small and medium-sized enterprises 
and on progressive support for the current 
informai sector. 
This kind of strategic approach calls for spatial 
planning that reinforces the territorial autho-
rities' resources and their complementarities. 
t he relocation of development policies and their 
articulation with the national level. The new gui-
delines for the Malian government's decentrali-
sation policy. with the establishment of the re-
gional development agencies and the creation 
of the new regions. are a step in this direction. 
The territorial prospective study conducted ,n the Ségou 
region in 2015 (Souris seau et al. 2016) uses population 
projections for 2035 and 2050 that assume the region's 
share in the total population of Mali (around 15%) remains 
stable. Based on a fertility rate of 6.14 children per wo-
man in 2015 (derivedfrom the 6.35 childrenperwoman 
estimated for the whole of Mali by the United Nations 
for the 2010·2015 period). the average hypothesis of a 
/inear decline in the fertJ!ity rate has been adopted. with 
3.5 children perwoman in 2050 (and 4. 6 in 2035). 
Jean-Michel Sourisseau, Mamy Soumaré, 
Jean-François Bélières, Sidiki Traoré 
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PASTORAL MOBILITY, FROM A SAHELIAN 
TO A SUB-REGIONAL ISSUE 
Public policies have long seen pastoral mobi-
lity as a problem, in connection with a some-
times divisive approach to productive land use. 
Today, because of the population, land tenure 
and economic dynamics at work in ail terri-
tories, securing mobility is becoming an 
economic and political challenge of regional or 
even continental importance. 
• Mobility, the core of an 
economy of shared resources 
Extensive cattle. sheep and goat breeding are 
the predominant activities in the Sahel region. 
Pastoralism is characterised by close interac-
tions between the family organisation. the 
herd structure and the natural surroundings. 
and these interactions require a great capa-
city for adaptation. Rangeland resources are 
heterogeneous. scat tered and transient: rain-
fall varies by 30% every year a round an average 
of 400 mm. ln the dry season. surface waters 
are rapidly transformed into strings of pools 
and plant cover disappears. making mobility 
an essential condition for the reproduction of 
Sahelian pastoral systems. Furthermore. the 
sustainability of this pastoral economy. with 
its uncertain. shared resources. depends on 
bundles of collective rights to the basic factors 
of production. in other words livestock and 
access to shared water points. lt is based on 
the division oftasks within the family and rights 
to livestock and to temporary labour. Finally. it 
responds to growing demand on markets that 
are located a long way from the pastoral areas. 
The dispersion of the resources needed for 
production is therefore not the only reason 
pastoralists leave their home area. Looking for 
sait (natron). avoiding contagious diseases or 
land conflicts and driving herds to end markets 
in the large cities are also reasons for moving 
livestock within the region. 
• The intensification of regional 
interdependence in changing 
territories 
Until the recurrent droughts of the 1970s and 
1980s. pastoral mobility was relatively unres-
tricted and confined globally to the Sahel 
countries. lndeed, f rom the 1950s. a number of 
pastoral hydraulic works built in dry sub-humid 
areas opened up regions that were previously 
useless in the dry season because of water 
scarcity. After the rainy season. herds thus 
moved. where possible. towards wetlands or 
rivers (Senegal River Valley. lnner Niger Delta) 
and to post-harvest agricultural land (grazing in 
exchange for fertilisation) and the huge terri-
tories under long fallow. 
During the last drought events of the 1980s. 
up to 80% of herds were decimated in some 
pastoral zones. and this mortality opened up 
areas for surviving herds. Moreover. people 
and animais migrated to the south. in the Sahel 
countries and even in the coastal countries. 
joining livestock farmers who had been living 
for decades in northern Nigeria. Benin. Togo. 
Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. At the same t ime. the 
reduction in trypanosomiasis (sleeping sic-
kness) prevalence and crossbreeding by lives-
tock farmers made it easier to move zebu and 
zebu cross cattle herds to the south. these 
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animais being less susceptible to this disease. 
Not ail of these farmers returned to the Sahel 
zone after the crisis. Sorne stayed in their host 
areas. maintaining links with pastoralists in 
their areas of origin and forging new ones with 
those in their new location. 
But since the 1980s. population growth has 
been altering the structure of pastoral and 
agro-pastoral areas. Human and animal popu-
lation densities are increasing and pastoral 
areas are diminishing due to t he expansion of 
agricultural land and of irrigated areas around 
water resources. ln agro-pastoral areas. fallow 
periods are now limited. Moreover. farmers of-
ten also rear livestock. Competition for water 
and rangelands is therefore exacerbated and 
mobility is becoming very restricted, especially 
in the southern areas. This is where more and 
more transhumant pastoralists are now to be 
found looking for pastoral resources. The mo-
bility of trade has also increased towards the 
capital cities of the coastal countries. which 
are becoming more and more populated. \Nith 
growing demand for red meat. 
More than in the past. but less than in the 
future. pastoral areas both within and outside 
the Sahel are necessarily interdependent and 
the shared use of land and resources is beco-
m ing more complex. Cross-border transhu-
m ance provides welcome supplies of animal 
products as well as trade and fiscal revenue at 
the borders. on markets and in towns. and pro-
vides fodder and ferti liser in the areas crossed. 
• Renewed interest in 
pastoralism as an opportunity 
for integration 
Mobile pastoralism is currently attracting much 
attention from a range of different stakeholders. 
Cross-border cooperation is in fact becoming 
a hobbyhorse for some coastal and Sahelian 
countries. for bilateral cooperation. regional 
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and non-governmental organisations. and for 
international financial institutions. Interven-
t ions cover different fields. even those that 
were not previously included in livestock deve-
lopment programmes: security. education. 
decentralisation. human health. etc. However. 
the stakeholders all have their ovvn priorities 
and. consequently. programmes overlap in the 
same field without any subsidiarity or coordina-
t ion. These initiatives. most of which are regio-
nal, could have a greater impact if the national 
policies on which they are based were to better 
integrate mobile pastoralism issues. and if re-
gional integration directives were applied more 
effectively. 
More secure. better regulated cross-border 
mobilitywould be an example for the regional in-
tegration of the main sector concerned by sub-
regional t rade in West Africa. This policy chal-
lenge represents an opportunity for decision 
makers to adopta truly regional approach and to 
work towards greater stability in the Sahel. which 
also undoubtedly depends on these cross-cut-
t ing processes. 
Christian Corniaux, Véronique Ancey, 
lbra Touré, Astou Camara, 
Jean-Daniel Cesaro 
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THE OUAGADOUGOU-ACCRA CORRIDOR: 
SPATIAL INCLUSION THROUGH STAPLE 
FOOD CROPS 
A heterogeneous area situated partial/y within 
the CFA franc zone, the Ouagadougou-Accra 
corridor is a reaf outsider in terms of regional 
integration in French-speaking Africa, and 
its food distribution channels foster comple-
mentarities between Ghana and Burkina Faso. 
Spontaneously reorganised during the lvorian 
crisis, the resufting flows are restructuring the 
area, indicating potential that is attracting 
institutional attention. 
• The concept of a corridor 
in West Africa 
The concept of a corridor has many interpre-
tations. As both a line of communicat ion and a 
project territory. the functions. goals and stake-
holders concerned differ from one corridor 
to another. With their concentrat ion of t rans-
portation routes connecting remote places. 
corridors also sometimes enable movement 
within the areas they go through. ln West Africa. 
the "Sahel-coastal" corridors are the legacy of 
colonial export infrastructure. reclassified after 
the countries gained independence as policies 
to tackle rural isolation. lnitially the port- railway 
combinations orchestrated the movement of 
agricultural and mining products from the hin-
terlands and. in return, supplied these areas with 
consumer goods. Infrast ructure policies have 
been conducted in these corridors for decades, 
with regional integration as a common goal for 
the different cooperation institutions. However. 
the effects of communication corridors do not 
necessarily result in the development of these 
territories. 
• A corridor outside the WAEMU 
Because of the route it takes and the formai 
tracte that gravitates around it. the Ouagadou-
gou-Accra corridor is not really the legacy of 
colonial infrastructure. The Kumasi-Accra road 
was indeed built for gold and cocoa in the early 
days of the Brit ish Gold Coast. but the Kuma-
si-Ouagadougou section. straddling Burkina 
Faso and Ghana, corresponds to other pro-
cesses. Tamale was only linked to Kumasi by 
Road in 1920. for administrative purposes and 
the recruitment of workers for the south of 
present-day Ghana. The stretch linking Oua-
gadougou to Tamale will be consolidated over 
the next decade. 
ln terms of the economy and transport. the 
successive colonial and national policies 
implemented until the m id-1990s left the 
landlocked states dependent on the outside, 
generally through a single sector and a single 
maritime outlet. These states then opted for 
competition between the marit ime outlet 
points which. combined with the lvorian cri-
sis. enabled the Ghanaian corridor to set itself 
apart from its neighbours, linked to Abidjan. 
Lomé or Cotonou. Formai international trade 
flows in the Ouagadougou-Accra corridor 
rapidly increased in volume in the 2000s. even 
though this area is an outsider to the West 
African Economie and Monetary Union (WAE-
MU) with no legacy of colonial infrastructure. 
A fi rst WAEMU/Ghana Road Programme was 
launched in 2002 under NEPAD. followed by 
economic integration policies and calls for 
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free movement by the Economie Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS). which 
includes the WAEMU member countries. But 
the removal of barriers to intra- regional trade 
is still limited: while ECOWAS external t rade 
benefits from a common tariff. internai move-
ments of goods remain problematic. 
• Enhancing complementarities 
in food production 
The main strength of this corridor is its diver-
sity: a Sahel-coastal cl imatic gradient com -
bined with a political. linguistic and monetary 
boundary. This diversity is a source of spatial 
complementarities illustrated by the food dis-
tribution channels for yams. maize and cow-
peas. Yams. which are relatively rare in Burkina 
Faso. are grown in the forest-savannah tran-
sit ion zone, f rom the border to the south of 
Lake Volta. whereas cowpeas are mostly pro-
duced in the north. in the Sahel zone. and to a 
lesser extent in Ghana. Maize is grown along 
the whole length of the corridor, with high 
concentrations in the southern parts of both 
countries. 
Flows of yams go in two directions: huge de-
mand from southern Ghanaian cit ies and mas-
sive exports towards the Sahel. Movements 
of cowpeas are mostly towards urban parts 
of Ghana, after concentration in the major 
markets of Burkina Faso. Grown in most parts 
of the corridor. maize follows more complex 
patterns: the southern half of Ghana has two 
rainy seasons. but the hum id t ropical climate is 
an obstacle to drying and conservation. Flows 
therefore have interannual variations depen-
ding on harvests. are reversed according to 
t he climate and are even reconfigured depen-
ding on prices. lt is not unusual for grain from 
Ghana to be dried in the Burkinabe Sahel zone 
before returning to its country of origin. As a 
priority. these flows of food crops are intended 
for urban market s. but they also meet growing. 
more diversified demand from the emerging 
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intermediate towns. and more recently from 
rural markets. which were previously largely 
self- sufficient. 
• A cross-border perspective 
for spatial inclusion 
The centre of gravity of cross-border tracte 
- whether formai or informai - has shifted in 
favour of connections between Ghana and 
Burkina Faso. rather than the tradit ional lvorian 
outlet inherited from colonial tracte flows and 
the Bobo-Dioulasso zone. ln an opportunistic 
manner. this tracte has intensified and market 
specialisation has restructured the economic 
area of the corridor. but it has not become 
more formalised as a result. Although free 
trade is hampered by numerous illegal levies, 
strategies to avoid these many obstacles and 
border crossing practices range from comple-
tely legal to completely illegal. As a result. this 
tracte network linking rural agricultural basins. 
intermediate towns. border markets and urban 
consumption hubs mobilises different types of 
stakeholders on different levels. from agricul-
ture to the retail trade. via transport. logistics 
and finance. 
Inclusive rural development projects have 
emerged in the cross-border areas this corri-
dor goes through. These include the Northern 
Rural Growth Programme and the Savannah 
Accelerated Development Authority in Ghana. 
and the Bagré Growth Pole in Burkina Faso. 
Over and above the interconnection of the 
areas it covers. the Ouagadougou-Accra corri-
dor provides a type ofhybrid integration. which 
is neither institutionalised nor completely 
info rmai. Through the dynamism of it s food 
distribution channels. this outsider corridor is 
a laboratory for more general spatial inclusion, 
which generates jobs and rural development. 
Gabriel Poujol 
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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH NORTH 
AFRICA1 S GROUNDWATER RESOURCES? 
Groundwater has become an important source 
ofwelfare in North Africa. lt is redefining irri-
gation frontiers and supplies water to more 
than 500 000 farms. However, more than half 
of aquifers, which cater to a minority of far-
mers, are declining. North Africa's groundwa-
ter economy is increasingly faced with physical 
and socio-economic stress. 
• North Africa's rapidly 
expanding groundwater economy 
North Africa has a long tradition of groundwa-
ter use in traditional irrigation systems. Howe-
ver, an agricultural groundwater economy. 
mainly based on private tube wells. emerged 
in the early 1980s with the availability of cheap 
technology, increased water demand and 
recurrent droughts. Groundwater use stimu-
lated the intensification and diversificat ion of 
farm ing systems and became the mainstay for 
more than 500 000 fa rms. lt now caters to 88 % 
of irrigated areas in Algeria. 42% in Morocco 
and 64% in Tunisia. However. about half of the 
aquifers have been declared overexploited and 
farmers' dependence on this vital resource 
means that a possible decline of the ground-
water economy is a serious issue. 
• Saiss: the expectations 
and risks of groundwater use 
Farmers in the fertile plains of northern and 
central Morocco increasingly rely on ground-
water to intensify and diversify their farming 
systems. These groundwater economies 
have existed for more than 30 years. and each 
supports several tens of thousands of hec-
tares ofirrigated agriculture. ln the Saiss plain. 
droughts in the early 1980s a long with the libe-
ralisation of the agricultural sector transfor-
med rain-fed farming systems into groundwa-
ter-based irrigated agriculture. ln 2012. 20°Ai 
of the lands in the Saiss were irrigated. 91 °/o of 
which (45 316 ha) depended on pump irriga-
tion. Groundwater caters mainly to orchards, 
vineyards. horticulture and fodder crops. Due 
to the rapid decline of groundwater tables. 
a considerable number of wells taking water 
from the phreatic aquifer are running dry and 
farmers are increasingly installing tube wells to 
gain access to the deep aquifer. which is now 
also declining. Smallholders in particular are 
unable to follow the decline of water tables. as 
they lack the resources to install tube wells and 
to conduct intensive market-oriented agri-
culture to pay back such investments. While 
groundwater raises tremendous expectations, 
especially for young farmers keen to develop 
their agriculture. it thus also implies conside-
rable risks: as water tables decline. farmers 
venture into more risky m arkets and may end 
up with debts. 
• Biskra: new irrigation frontiers 
in the Sahara 
Algeria's Sahara is one of the most water-rich 
regions in Africa due to the presence of enor-
mous sedimentary aquifers. but with very low 
recharge rates. Groundwater is increasingly 
pumped for agriculture through deep tube 
wells. While in the past irrigation development 
was limited to some oases. private groundwa-
ter-based irrigation has changed the outlook 
for Saharan agriculture. ln Biskra. the irriga-
ted area increased five-fold from 16 500 ha in 
1969 to more than 104 000 ha in 2013. A total 
of 94% of irrigation water is currently supplied 
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by groundwater through more than 4 200 wells 
and 9 000 tube wells. On these new irrigation 
f rontiers, there has been a rapid extension of 
commercial palm groves (43 000 ha in 2014. 
60°/oof which grow the reputed deglet nour 
variety) and intensive horticulture (17 365 ha; 
of which 4 900 ha produce greenhouse to-
matoes. bell peppers and melons). Biskra's 
groundwater economy is developing at a very 
rapid pace. The classical limiting factors (mar-
kets. capital, labour, land and water) will un-
doubtedly emerge. but in the meantime. the 
agricultural boom is likely to continue. 
• Kairouan: surface water 
development is inextricably 
linked to groundwater use 
ln the Merguellil river basin in central Tunisia. 
watershed development has focused on im-
proving livelihoods. preserving soil and water 
resources and ensuring flood protect ion. This 
led to the construction of numerous water 
conservation structures and the El Haouareb 
dam in 1989. which reduced runoff and stored 
water upstream. This seriously affected 
groundwater recharge in the Kairouan plain. 
which was now limited to the area around the 
dam rather than extending along the whole 
riverbed across the plain. Meanwhile, ground-
water development began with public tube 
wells in the 1970s to supply drinking water to 
the coast and to develop groundwater-based 
irrigated agriculture. Private irrigation rapidly 
took over to secure livelihoods and to poten-
tially make profit with high-value crops. Nowa-
days. groundwater use from over 2 000 pri-
vate tube wells is estimated to be equivalent 
to withdrawals from the 135 public tube wells, 
delivering 120 hm3/year. The total ground-
water-based irrigated area was 20 000 ha in 
2010. The combined effect ofwatershed de-
velopment and groundwater use has caused 
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the water table to drop by 30m over the last 40 
years. Farmers have had to adapt their irriga-
tion systems to follow this decline. which has 
caused a number of smallholders to drop out 
of the race. 
• Sustainable groundwater use 
or mining with care? 
Most aquifers in North Africa are intensively 
exploited. as evidenced by the general decline 
in water tables. Often. the official ambitions of 
regulating groundwater use relate to the sus-
tainable use of groundwater. understood as 
obtaining a new equilibrium in which ground-
water use and recharge level out. Hydrologists 
challenge the relevance of this concept. as the 
exploitation of an aquifer with an imbalanced 
regime is not necessarily synonymous with 
long-term reserve depletion. Moreover. expe-
rience shows that reducing groundwater use in 
the short term is not realistic. as it has become 
too important from a social. economic and po-
litical viewpoint. Sustainable groundwater use 
is thus a fallacy, especially for the aquifers in 
the south. which have very low recharge rates. 
lt is therefore better to acknowledge present 
groundwater practices as unsustainable and 
to focus the debate on what societies want 
to achieve with groundwater in terms of (rural) 
development. This cou Id be called "mining with 
care". 
Marcel Kuper, Ali Hammani, Fatah Ameur, 
Meriem Farah Hamamouche, 
Sylvain Massuel, Tarik Hartani 
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WATER, A RESOURCE REQUIRING BETTER 
GOVERNANCE IN WEST AFRICA 
West Africa has a relative/y large number of 
major rivers. Irrigation and hydroelectricity 
are gaining ground in the region, but are still far 
from reaching their full potential. Possibilities 
exist for meeting food and energy demands 
from the rapidly growing populations and eco-
nomies. International river basin agencies are 
responsible for coordinating investment and 
resolving disputes. 
• Untapped potential 
and growing demands 
West Africa has a number of different climate 
zones ranging from the Saharan fringe to the 
Gulf of Guinea. Major fluctuations in rainfall in 
the 20th century were the cause of several se-
rious food crises. For the future. climate fore-
casts remain hesitant: most models predict a 
slight increase in rainfall that will not offset the 
increase in evaporation caused by higher tem-
peratures. 
Surface water and groundwater are relatively 
abundant in the region. The south. which is 
wetter. suffers from regular flooding and the 
aquifers are relatively productive. ln the North. 
which is far more arid. the Senegal. Niger. Volta 
and Chari rivers support high population densi-
ties thanks to floodplain meadows. to flooded. 
flood recession and irrigated cropping. and to 
fishing. These rivers are currently being regu-
lated by dams and should be able to respond 
more effectively to rapidly growing demand. 
Despite significant national differences. popu-
lation growth in the 15 West African countries 
is indeed high (at around 3% per year) and eco-
nomic growth in these countries is sustained 
(at around 5%). a situation which is generating 
a rapid increase in water and energy require-
ments for households. industries. mines and 
services. but also for agriculture. However. 
governments are struggling to satisfy this de-
mand and the Millennium Development Goals 
for drinking water have not been achieved. in 
spite of considerable progress. Less than 2% 
of cultivated areas are irrigated and hydroe-
lectric installations fall far short of the region's 
high potential. Just under 45% of the popula-
t ion has access to electricity. around 40°/o of 
which is generated by dams. 
• Major water engineering 
projects, a come-back? 
After a break between the 1980s and the 
2000s further to the structural adjustment 
plans. water engineering projects. some of 
which are quite old. are being dusted off. This 
return is explained by soaring demand for 
electricity and food requirements that make 
irrigation necessary. but also by more frequent 
flooding. which requires new hydraulic works. 
Finally, the decline in public debt is providing 
leeway for new investments. While Western 
countries are increasingly reluctant due to the 
cost and the social and environmental impacts 
of dams. China seems to be willing to finance 
and carry out major engineering projects. 
The major hydro-agricultural installations have 
been criticised in the past because of their 
poor returns on investment. Progress has 
nevertheless been made in the Senegal River 
Valley and the Office du Niger (Mali). where 
yields are increasing and rice cultivation is be-
coming competitive with Asian rice imports. 
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Projects for the expansion of large-scale irri-
gation schemes are therefore being revived. 
At the same t ime. small-scale private irrigation 
is continuing its expansion: hundreds of thou-
sands of smallholder farmers are settling along 
rivers and reservoirs or are digging wells where 
groundwat er is accessible. They produce irri-
gated fruits and vegetables through manual 
water lifting or inexpensive motor pumps. 
Deep aquifers are sti ll untapped. but their use 
could intensify with the development of elec-
trification. Proper regulation will be required in 
order to avoid their overexploitation. 
• Setter governance is needed 
to address risks 
The authorities and civil society are concerned 
about the environmental and health situation 
in the water sector. First. water-borne diseases 
still have serious impacts on populations. es-
pecially chronic diarrhoea due to the lack of 
drinking water and/or sanitation (which also 
concerns cities that are often subject to water 
cuts). Second. the majorwetlands. such as the 
lnner Niger Delta. Lake Chad and the flood val-
leys. have seen their surface areas drastically 
reduced and their biodiversity significantly de-
graded. Marine deltas. especially those of the 
Niger. Senegal and Gambia rivers. are being 
disrupted by sea level rise. river regulation by 
large dams and climate change, which are en-
dangering their fragile ecosystems. 
Dam building and hydraulic works have given 
rise to a number of cross-border conflicts that 
have generally remained of low intensity. with 
the exception of the one between Senegal and 
Mauritania (between 1989 and 1991) concer-
ning the irrigable land of the Senegal River. To-
day. Ghana is taking Burkina Faso to task over 
its 1 500 small reservoirs. which are reducing 
the production of its major hydro-electricit y 
dams. Engineering projects are ringing alarm 
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bells in neighbouring countries: Nigeria. which 
has traditionally sold its electricity at a low cost 
to Niger in order to avoid the construction of a 
dam upstream on the river. is concerned about 
the Kandadji dam. The Fomi dam in Guinea will 
have a significant impact on the lnner Niger 
Delta in Mali and downstream. 
The construction of new dams lead s to people 
being displaced against their w ill. Conflicts 
over access to land are exacerbated in irri-
gable areas. because the states foster the 
installation of national and international private 
investors in order to im prove food produc-
tion. fuelling concerns and opposition among 
local farmers and their organisations. lrrigated 
land also reduces water access corridors for 
animais. generating incidents that are often 
violent. whereas pastoral conflicts over access 
to wells are diminishing due to the creation of 
consultative bodies. 
Better governance of wat er resou rces will the-
refore become a necessity and should result in 
an increase in international cooperation. There 
are several inter-state river basin agencies in 
operation. Their effectiveness is highlyvariable 
and their capacities could be strengthened. 
They nevertheless provide a basis for effective 
solutions to sharing the water from the major 
rivers. anticipating tensions and settling dis-
putes. 
Bruno Barbier, Alioune Kane, 
Bega Ouedraogo, Jean-Yves Jamin, 
Jean Christophe Poussin 
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Cross-cutting note 
This update of the atlas takes into account the 
creation of South Sudan. but some datais sti/1 una-
vailable. ln this case. values for Sudan have been 
applied to South Sudan with the symbol Il (note 
applicable to spreads 2. 8 and 9). 
Specfflc notes 
Spread2 
The size of each square is proportional to the 
cumulative annual cohorts of young people rea-
ching the 15-24 age group over the 2015-2030 
period. The size of an annual cohort corres-
ponds to 1/10 of the 15-24 age group calcula-
ted for each year of the reference period. 
SpreadS 
ln the anamorphic representation adopted 
for maps M 11 and M 12. also called area car-
tograms. the traditional representation of the 
different countries expressed in km2 has been 
replaced by the total value of GDP (M 11) and by 
the population (M12). while conserving geogra-
phical contours that are consequently defor-
med in proportion to the value of each indicator. 
Spread6 
Figure n°7 represents an assessment of the 
regional integration index according to two 
specific dimensions. This data cornes from 
the Africa Regional lntegration Index Report 
2016 (AU. AFDB. UN. 2016). which produces a 
regional integration index for Africa. This glo-
bal index is composed of 16 indicators grouped 
according to fïve dimensions: regional infras-
tructure. financial and macroeconomic inte-
gration. free movement of people. productive 
integration and trade integration. For this atlas. 
we have chosen to represent two of these: the 
free movement of people and trade integration. 
This report specifïes three criteria for evaluating 
the free movement of people: the proportion 
of regional economic community (REC) mem-
ber countries whose nationals are issued with 
a visa on arrivai; ratification (or not) of the REC 
protocol on the free movement of persons: 
and the proportion of REC member count ries 
whose nationals do not require a visa for entry. 
Four criteria are used to evaluate trade integra-
tion: the level of customs duties on imports: 
the share of intra-regional goods imports (% of 
GDP); the share ofintra-regional goods experts 
(o/o of GDP); and the share of total intra- regional 
goods trade (o/o of total intra-REC trade). 
Spread8 
The prospective study on incarne in 2050 is 
based on projections of agricultural value ad-
ded. GDP, agricultural labour force and total 
population. GDP data are taken from the MAGE 
model from the Centre de Recherche Français 
dans le Domaine de l'Economie Internationale 
(CEPII - French research centre in internatio-
nal economics). the OECD ENV-Growth model 
and a medium scenario from the International 
lnstitute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
known as the "middle-of-the-road" scenario 
(SSP2). Calculations of the agricultural labour 
force in 2050 are the result of geometric extra-
polation of ILO data for the 1980-2020 period. 
Projections were based on the most recent rural 
population and total population data (UN 2015 
revision). For agricultural value-added. we used 
calculations of the "net unit prices" of individual 
products applied to net production volumes 
(which are assumed to move in line with gross 
production). Two volume growth scenarios 
were adopted: i) we apply yield growth rates for 
cereals. oilseeds. animal products. coffee. co-
coa and rubber observed over the last 40 years 
in East Asia and Western Europe. and for other 
products. we adopt growth rates estimated by 
FAO: ii) we use data from the FAO GAEZ project 
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and from IIASA to project both areas and yields 
in 2050. bearing in mind that where yields are 
concerned. the effects of climate change are 
integrated using the IPCC Bl scenario. and that 
we assume a medium intensity technological 
package. Other assumptions are also adopted 
concerning land constraints and the extension 
of irrigation according to forest protection and 
water availability. 
Spread11 
To estimate the share of minerai resources in 
total experts. data from the World Development 
lndicators (WDI) database were difficult to use, 
and were therefore supplemented by data from 
alternative sources for 2014 or 2015 (OECD. 
AFDB. African Economie Outlook. Embassies· 
economic departments. etc.). 
Spread13 
Monitoring large-scale land acquisitions could 
be compared to using a radar in the fog. lndeed, 
due to their lack of transparency. monitoring 
land transactions (identification. quantification. 
dynamics) is problematic. The data presented 
in this spread are based on "Land Matrix". which 
defines large-scale land acquisitions as deals 
that: 
entail a transfer of rights to use. contrai or 
ownership of land through sale. lease or conces-
sion: 
caver an area of 200 hectares or more: 
have been initiated since the year 2000: 
imply a change of land use; 
are concluded for agricultural purposes. 
Mining projects and tourism operations are the-
refore excluded from this analysis. 
Land Matrix may only reflect partial information. 
but it is nevertheless a good basis that can be 
used to achieve a better understanding of the 
scope of the phenomenon and to develop hy-
potheses and initial analyses. 
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Spread15 
This map represents renewable water resources 
considered as those which. after use. should re-
turn to their previous stock level through natu-
ral replenishment processes (rainfall). The vast 
majority of renewable water cornes from sur-
face water. The map also represents what we 
call the "dependency ratio". which corresponds 
to the percentage of renewable water resources 
originating outside the country. The countries 
with high water availability are generally those in 
downstream parts of large international rivers. 
and are therefore relatively "dependent" on 
water from other countries. Islands have zero 
dependence. since they are not connected to 
rivers on the continent. 
Spread22 
The maps produced by the author use datage-
nerated in Ghana by the statistics department 
of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (SRID/ 
MOFA) and the RS/GIS Laboratory: in Burkina 
Faso by the MARSAHA statistics department 
and INSD-RPGH; and in a cross-Cutting manner 
data produced bythe World Conservation Moni-
toring Cent re. the Openstreetmap. Africapolis 
and Digital Chart of the World databases. and 
data f rom field surveys conducted by the author 
to identify flows of products traded (thesis by 
G. Poujol. forthcoming). For the map on flows of 
maize. based on surveys of around 100 traders. 
the transport f requency indicator expresses 
the usage rate of each stretch of road for maize 
transportation. calculated across the whole 
network used. This indicator gives a macrosco-
pic overview of the flow density and differen-
tiates the road network according to its usage 
for maize transportation. 
Spread23 
The data used in this spread were produced as 
part of the "Groundwater" project financed by 
the Agence Nationale de la Recherche (French 
national research agency) (ANR CEP S 09/11) 
and the SIRMA and SICMED networks. The 
authors took inspiration from one of their publi-
cations. the collective work: Kuper M. Faysse N. 
Hammani A. Hartani T. Marlet S. Hamamouche 
MF. Ameur F .. 2015. Liberation or Anarchy? The 
Janus Nature of Groundwater Use on North 
Africa's New Irrigation Frontiers. ln: Integrated 
Groundwater Management. A Jakeman. 0 Bar-
reteau. R Hunt. JD Rinaudo. A Ross (se EdJ 
Springer. Dordrecht. The Netherlands: 583-
615. ISBN 978-3 -319-23576-9 
Spread24 
HSM/IRD. HydroSciences Montpellier is a joint 
research unit between IRD. the National Centre 
for Scientific Research and the University of 
Montpellier. Parts of their work. especially maps 
dra~vn by Claudine Dieulin, have formed the ba-
sis for the realization of the map of the spread 
24 on Water in West Africa. 
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